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Abstract:  
The authors argue that while both Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and national 
governments have mechanisms to fight corruption, the outcomes of these enforcement 
mechanisms diverge.  MDBs are interested in the causes and effects of corruption from a 
development perspective and, as such, tend to sanction Small and Medium Enterprises and 
individuals, while national governments are focused on a more punitive outcome, targeting 
larger multinational corporations. The article examines the enforcement objectives 
articulated in national legislation, namely the American Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act 
and its Canadian counterpart (the CFPOA) as well as several Canadian cases, on the one 
hand, and the tools and outcomes of the MDBs’ Sanctions Systems on the other. The 
authors conclude that national enforcement efforts and MDBs’ sanctions outcomes 
intersect in their fight against international corruption in that their results are 
complimentary; the former punishing large-scale offenders, while the latter ensuring the 
integrity of development projects. 
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Corruption	  and	  Development	  	  
The	  need	  of	  International	  Investigations	  with	  a	  multijurisdictional	  approach	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  
Multilateral	  Development	  Banks	  with	  National	  Authorities	  
Juan	  G.	  Ronderos1	  
Michelle	  Ratpan	  
Andrea	  Osorio	  Rincon	  
Introduction	  
Since	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (US)	  Foreign	  Corrupt	  Practices	  Act	  (FCPA)	  in	  1977,	  the	  world	  has	  
witnessed	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  number	  of	  international	  conventions,	  agreements,	  and	  national	  laws	  aimed	  
at	  tackling	  international	  corruption.	  	  The	  Organization	  of	  American	  States,	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  OECD,	  
the	  Multilateral	  Development	  Banks	  (MDBs)2,	  and	  an	  ever-­‐growing	  number	  of	  nations	  have	  adopted	  
tools	  to	  address	  international	  corruption	  from	  diverse	  angles.	  International	  treaties	  and	  agreements	  
have	  aimed	  at	  enticing	  nations	  to	  adopt	  anti-­‐corruption	  legislation	  to	  forbid	  the	  bribing	  of	  foreign	  
officials	  by	  their	  nationals,	  while	  the	  MDBs	  and	  national	  jurisdictions	  have	  created	  specific	  tools	  to	  
target	  international	  corruption.	  	  Although	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  unity	  of	  purpose	  amongst	  these	  treaties,	  
agreements,	  organizations	  and	  nations,	  there	  are	  some	  significant	  differences.	  	  National	  jurisdictions	  are	  
interested	  in	  punishing	  corporations	  and	  individuals	  for	  bribing	  foreign	  officials	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  protect	  
commercial	  national	  interest	  in	  the	  international	  market,	  while	  MDBs	  are	  more	  interested	  in	  confronting	  
the	  pervasive	  effect	  of	  corruption	  in	  development	  projects	  in	  the	  countries	  they	  serve.	  	  These	  two	  
objectives	  may	  coincide	  in	  some	  instances,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  international	  bribery	  case	  of	  Canadian	  
construction	  company	  SNC-­‐Lavalin,	  where	  the	  World	  Bank	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  this	  company	  
in	  Bangladesh,	  while	  the	  Royal	  Canadian	  Mounted	  Police	  had	  been	  looking	  into	  the	  company’s	  dealings	  
in	  Montreal.	  	  But	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases,	  MDBs	  are	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  
corruption	  in	  development	  projects	  in	  member	  countries3	  than	  targeting	  big	  multinational	  
corporations,4	  leading	  to	  the	  sanctioning	  of	  smaller	  national	  or	  regional	  corporations5	  and	  individuals.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  We	  would	  like	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  kind	  contribution	  of	  Julia	  Wojtowicz	  who	  assisted	  in	  writing	  this	  article.	  
2	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  MDBs	  refer	  to	  the	  Multilateral	  Development	  Banks	  that	  are	  signatories	  of	  the	  2010	  "Agreement	  
on	  Mutual	  Enforcement	  of	  Debarment	  Decisions"	  or	  Cross	  Debarment	  Agreement.	  	  These	  MDBs	  are	  the	  African	  Development	  
Bank	  Group,	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank,	  the	  European	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development,	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  and	  
the	  IDB	  Group.	  	  
3	  Member	  countries	  are	  the	  member	  states	  that	  own	  each	  of	  the	  MDBs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  
(IDB),	  it	  is	  owned	  by	  48	  member	  states,	  of	  which	  26	  are	  borrowing	  members	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean.	  The	  IDB	  was	  
founded	  in	  1959	  as	  a	  partnership	  between	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Over	  the	  next	  several	  decades,	  
the	  Bank	  expanded	  its	  membership,	  initially	  through	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago	  became	  a	  member	  in	  1967,	  
to	  be	  soon	  joined	  by	  Barbados	  (1969),	  Jamaica	  (1969),	  Canada	  (1972),	  Guyana	  (1976),	  The	  Bahamas	  (1977)	  and	  Suriname	  
(1980).	  The	  22	  non-­‐regional	  or	  non-­‐Western	  Hemisphere	  member	  countries,	  joined	  between	  1976	  and	  1986.	  Belize	  became	  a	  
member	  in	  1992	  and	  Croatia	  and	  Slovenia	  joined	  as	  successor	  states	  of	  Yugoslavia	  in	  1993.	  The	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  became	  a	  
member	  country	  in	  2005	  and	  the	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China	  became	  a	  member	  country	  in	  2009.	  (Inter-­‐American	  Development	  
Bank,	  January	  9,	  2015),	  online:	  Member	  Countries	  <http://www.iadb.org/en/about-­‐us/member-­‐countries,6291.html>.	  	  	  
4	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  MDBs	  avoid	  investigating	  and	  pursuing	  leads	  related	  to	  alleged	  misconduct	  by	  large	  multinational	  
corporations.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  one	  of	  the	  major	  parameters	  to	  decide	  what	  is	  investigated	  and/or	  who	  is	  sanctioned.	  
2	  
	  
The	  OECD	  Convention	  on	  Combating	  Bribery	  of	  Foreign	  Public	  Officials	  in	  International	  Business	  
Transactions	  (OECD	  Convention)	  and	  similar	  international	  instruments	  aim	  at	  ensuring	  that	  all	  
jurisdictions	  adopt	  comparable	  legislation	  to	  the	  FCPA,	  outlawing	  foreign	  bribery	  across	  the	  board.	  	  As	  a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  enacted	  legislations,	  national	  anti-­‐corruption	  enforcement	  systems	  are	  directed	  at	  
punishing	  offenders	  criminally	  or	  imposing	  fines	  and	  civil	  sanctions	  on	  those	  entities	  that	  have	  violated	  
national	  laws	  related	  to	  foreign	  bribery.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  US,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  concerns	  for	  US	  
authorities	  in	  relation	  to	  bribery	  of	  foreign	  officials	  has	  been	  to	  “level	  the	  playing	  field”	  so	  that	  US	  
corporations	  can	  fairly	  compete	  abroad	  with	  other	  corporations.6	  The	  US	  considers	  that	  international	  
corruption	  takes	  away	  fair	  and	  competitive	  business,	  inhibiting	  American	  corporations	  for	  doing	  
business	  abroad.	  	  The	  US	  has	  decided	  to	  fight	  corruption	  to	  protect	  the	  ability	  of	  US	  companies	  to	  
compete	  on	  the	  global	  scales.7	  	  
MDBs	  have	  had	  a	  different	  thrust.	  	  MDBs	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  pervasive	  effects	  of	  corruption	  in	  
development	  in	  the	  countries	  and	  sectors	  they	  serve.	  	  More	  specifically,	  MDBs	  are	  entrusted	  to	  ensure	  
that	  the	  funds	  they	  have	  received	  and	  administer	  are	  strictly	  used	  for	  the	  purpose	  for	  which	  they	  were	  
intended:	  development.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  mechanisms	  is	  a	  tangible	  way	  by	  which	  MDBs	  
fulfill	  this	  fiduciary	  duty	  of	  ensuring	  proper	  use	  of	  funds.8	  	  But	  most	  importantly,	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  MDBs	  can	  ensure	  that	  communities	  are	  being	  properly	  served	  by	  projects	  sponsored	  by	  MDBs,	  
making	  sure	  that	  funds	  are	  not	  being	  squandered	  or	  diverted.	  	  The	  key	  difference	  between	  MDBs’	  anti-­‐
corruption	  systems	  and	  that	  of	  national	  authorities	  is	  the	  objective.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  MDBs’	  anti-­‐
corruption	  Sanctioning	  System	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  funds	  are	  not	  being	  misused	  and	  to	  avoid	  doing	  
business	  with	  entities	  and/or	  individuals	  who	  have	  been	  found	  to	  have	  committed	  prohibited	  practices,	  
including	  corruption.9	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  objective	  is	  to	  safeguard	  the	  developmental	  objectives	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  These	  types	  of	  companies	  are	  referred	  herein	  as	  Small	  and	  Medium	  Enterprises	  (SMEs).	  	  	  
6	  Roger	  P.	  Alford,	  Broken	  Windows	  Theory	  of	  International	  Corruption,	  A	  Symposium:	  The	  FCPA	  at	  Thirty-­‐Five	  and	  Its	  Impact	  on	  
Global	  Business	  (73	  Ohio	  St.	  L.J.1253,	  2012)	  1272-­‐1273.	  
7	  Caldwel	  Leslie	  R.,	  	  Assistant	  General	  Attorney	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  Remarks,	  Duke	  University	  School	  of	  Law,	  Durham,	  NC,	  
(October	  23,	  2014),	  online:<http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-­‐attorney-­‐general-­‐leslie-­‐r-­‐caldwell-­‐speaks-­‐duke-­‐
university-­‐school-­‐law>	  
8	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank,	  Agreement	  Establishing	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank,	  Article	  III,	  Section	  1.	  Use	  of	  
Resources,	  (April	  8,	  1959),	  online:	  <http://www.iadb.org/leg/documents/pdf/convenio-­‐eng.pdf>.	  The	  International	  Bank	  for	  
Reconstruction	  and	  Development,	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  III	  General	  Provisions	  Relating	  to	  Loans	  and	  
Guarantees,	  Section	  1.	  Use	  of	  Resources,	  (February	  16,	  1989),	  online:	  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-­‐articlesofagreement.pdf>	  	  
9	  A	  prohibited	  or	  sanctionable	  practice	  as	  defined	  under	  the	  Uniform	  Framework	  for	  Preventing	  and	  Combating	  Fraud	  and	  
Corruption(the	  “IFI	  Framework”)	  includes:	  
• ‘Corrupt	  practice:	  the	  offering,	  giving,	  receiving,	  or	  soliciting,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  of	  anything	  of	  value	  to	  influence	  
improperly	  the	  actions	  of	  another	  party.’	  
• ‘Fraudulent	  practice:	  any	  act	  or	  omission,	  including	  a	  misrepresentation,	  that	  knowingly	  or	  recklessly	  misleads,	  or	  
attempts	  to	  mislead,	  a	  party	  to	  obtain	  a	  financial	  or	  other	  benefit	  or	  to	  avoid	  an	  obligation.’	  
• ‘Collusive	  practice:	  an	  arrangement	  between	  two	  or	  more	  parties	  designed	  to	  achieve	  an	  improper	  purpose,	  including	  
to	  influence	  improperly	  the	  actions	  of	  another	  party	  (e.g.	  leaking	  of	  bid	  information,	  rigged	  specifications).’	  
• ‘Coercive	  practice	  is	  impairing	  or	  harming,	  or	  threatening	  to	  impair	  or	  harm,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  any	  party	  or	  the	  





projects,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  communities	  that	  are	  being	  served,	  and	  excluding	  those	  actors	  who	  
have	  demonstrated	  that	  they	  do	  not	  adhere	  to	  the	  ethical	  standards	  expected	  in	  a	  development	  project.	  
Building	  on	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  mechanisms,	  this	  Article	  will	  explore	  the	  differences	  
between	  the	  enforcement	  objectives	  of	  national	  legislations	  and	  authorities,	  such	  as	  the	  FCPA	  and	  the	  
Canadian	  Corruption	  of	  Foreign	  Public	  Officials	  Act	  (CFPOA)	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  tools	  used	  by	  
MDBs	  on	  the	  other,	  taking	  into	  account	  that	  both	  systems	  are	  aimed	  at	  “fighting	  corruption.”	  	  This	  
Article	  builds	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  foreign	  bribery	  is	  a	  multifaceted	  proposition	  with	  multiple	  victims	  and	  
actors.	  	  Consequently,	  addressing	  corruption	  in	  international	  development	  requires	  action	  and	  
collaboration	  from	  all	  actors	  (national	  and	  international)	  while	  using	  different	  legal	  tools.	  	  National	  
criminal,	  local	  and	  international,	  investigations	  have	  to	  be	  complemented	  with	  MDBs	  international	  
administrative	  ones	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  effectiveness.	  	  However,	  there	  has	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  understanding	  
of	  their	  differences	  and	  limitations	  in	  order	  to	  appropriately	  measure	  success	  in	  each	  of	  the	  systems.	  	  	  
To	  that	  end,	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  Article	  will	  explore	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  FCPA	  in	  the	  late	  seventies,	  and	  
how	  the	  statute	  was	  later	  transformed	  in	  the	  late	  eighties.	  	  This	  section	  will	  present	  a	  brief	  description	  
of	  the	  history	  of	  enforcement	  of	  the	  FCPA.	  	  This	  will	  provide	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  current	  sense	  of	  
purpose	  and	  objectives	  within	  the	  US	  foreign	  anti-­‐corruption	  system.	  	  	  
The	  second	  section	  will	  concentrate	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  CFPOA	  and	  its	  history	  of	  enforcement.	  	  
Cases	  discussed	  will	  include	  Nikko	  Resources,10	  Griffiths,11	  and	  Karigar12,	  each	  of	  which	  illustrates	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  CFPOA	  as	  a	  punishment	  and	  deterrent	  tool.	  	  This	  section	  will	  also	  examine	  two	  
cases	  strongly	  connected	  to	  the	  international	  development	  context.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  of	  Acres	  
International,	  a	  Canadian	  civil	  engineering	  firm	  found	  guilty	  by	  the	  Lesotho	  courts	  for	  corrupt	  acts,	  but	  
never	  prosecuted	  by	  Canadian	  authorities.	  The	  second	  case	  is	  SNC-­‐Lavalin,	  which	  highlights	  an	  evolution	  
towards	  greater	  enforcement	  of	  the	  CFPOA	  and	  increased	  collaboration	  between	  Canadian	  authorities	  
and	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
The	  third	  section	  will	  explain	  how	  MDBs	  got	  involved	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption	  after	  1996,	  and	  their	  
enforcement	  mechanism	  created	  and	  perfected	  in	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	  	  Specifically,	  this	  
section	  will	  address	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  MDBs’	  involvement	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption	  and	  why	  
it	  is	  international	  in	  nature.	  	  It	  will	  describe	  the	  different	  tools	  used	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  
Bank	  (IDB)	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  (WBG)	  to	  address	  corruption	  in	  development	  projects.	  	  In	  order	  to	  
illustrate	  the	  effects	  of	  corruption	  in	  development	  projects	  and	  demonstrate	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
involvement	  of	  MDBs	  in	  this	  field,	  two	  cases	  will	  be	  analyzed	  that	  will	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10Her	  Majesty	  the	  Queen	  vs.	  Niko	  Resources	  Ltd.,	  (Court	  of	  Queen's	  Bench	  in	  Alberta,	  Judicial	  District	  of	  Calgary	  June	  23,	  2011).	  	  
11Her	  Majesty	  the	  Queen	  vs.	  Griffiths	  Energy	  International	  Inc.	  E-­‐File	  No.:CCQ13GRIFFITHSENER,	  Action	  No.	  130057425Q1,	  
(January	  25,	  2013).	  	  
12Her	  Majesty	  the	  Queen	  v.	  Karigar,	  2014	  ONSC,	  2093,	  Court	  file	  No.:	  10-­‐030208.	  
4	  
	  
pursuing	  Small	  and	  Medium	  Enterprises	  (SMEs)	  13,	  and	  the	  ultimate	  objective	  of	  fighting	  corruption	  for	  
the	  MDBs.	  
In	  closing,	  this	  Article	  will	  address	  the	  question	  of	  where	  do	  national	  enforcement	  efforts	  and	  MDBs	  
intersect	  in	  their	  fight	  against	  international	  corruption.	  	  It	  will	  also	  present	  the	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  
objectives	  of	  the	  actions	  taken	  by	  national	  jurisdictions	  and	  MDBs	  differ.	  	  Canadian	  and	  US	  authorities	  
have	  concentrated	  their	  enforcement	  efforts	  in	  sizable	  corporations	  with	  international	  reach,	  while	  the	  
MDBs	  have	  concentrated	  their	  efforts	  on	  SMEs,	  which	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases	  are	  local	  or	  regional.	  	  This	  
article	  submits	  that,	  although	  the	  outcomes	  are	  significantly	  different	  at	  the	  national	  level	  and	  at	  the	  
MDBs,	  they	  are	  complimentary	  in	  nature.	  	  However,	  measuring	  success	  in	  both	  instances	  relates	  to	  their	  
different	  origins	  and	  objectives	  and	  hence,	  drawing	  comparisons	  in	  enforcement	  efforts	  could	  be	  
misleading.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  World	  Bank	  defines	  SMEs	  by	  the	  number	  of	  its	  employees.	  However,	  the	  World	  Bank	  does	  not	  present	  a	  distinct	  number.	  
It	  varies	  from	  5	  to	  99	  employees	  or	  even	  up	  to	  250	  employees.	  The	  IDB	  defines	  small	  firms	  as	  those	  with	  5	  to	  49	  employees	  and	  
medium-­‐sized	  enterprises	  as	  those	  with	  50	  to	  499	  employees	  (see	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group’s	  Targeted	  Support	  for	  
Small	  and	  Medium	  Enterprises,	  Approach	  Paper,	  Independent	  Evaluation	  Group	  –	  World	  Bank	  Group	  (7	  January	  2013),	  online:	  
<https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/ap_evaluationof_smes.pdf>	  (last	  access:	  23	  October	  2014);	  Arturo	  Galindo	  
Alejandro	  Micco,Bank,	  Credit	  to	  Small	  and	  Medium-­‐Sized	  Enterprises:	  The	  Role	  of	  Creditor	  Protection,	  Inter-­‐American	  
Development	  Bank,	  Working	  Paper	  #	  527	  (2005)	  5,	  online:	  <http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubWP-­‐527.pdf>	  




In	  the	  US,	  the	  enforcement	  authority	  of	  the	  FCPA	  is	  shared	  between	  DOJ	  and	  SEC.14	  	  The	  DOJ	  is	  in	  charge	  
of	  the	  criminal	  FCPA	  enforcement	  authority.	  	  DOJ	  jurisdiction	  covers	  criminal	  and	  civil	  enforcement	  for	  
the	  FCPA’s	  anti-­‐bribery	  provisions	  over	  domestic	  concerns,	  which	  include:	  (a)	  U.S.	  citizens,	  nationals	  and	  
resident,	  and	  (b)	  US	  business	  and	  their	  offices,	  director,	  employees,	  agents,	  or	  stockholders	  acting	  on	  
the	  domestic	  concern’s	  behalf.	  15	  The	  SEC	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  civil	  enforcement	  of	  the	  FCPA	  over	  
issuers	  and	  their	  officers,	  director,	  employees,	  agents,	  or	  stockholders	  acting	  on	  the	  issuer’s	  behalf.16	  
Even	  though	  the	  DOJ	  and	  the	  SEC	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  enforce	  the	  FCPA,	  these	  federal	  entities	  work	  in	  
close	  collaboration	  with	  many	  other	  federal	  agencies17	  including	  the	  United	  States	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  
Investigation	  (FBI).	  18	  Cross-­‐collaboration	  between	  these	  agencies	  has	  been	  a	  key	  factor	  to	  the	  successful	  
prosecution	  of	  FCPA	  violations.	  	  	  
Although	  the	  FCPA	  was	  enacted	  in	  1977	  and	  amended	  in	  1988	  and	  1998,	  significant	  enforcement	  only	  
began	  in	  the	  late	  2000.19	  	  In	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  FCPA’s	  existence,	  the	  SEC	  only	  tried	  few	  cases.20	  
Between	  1978	  and	  2000,	  the	  SEC	  and	  the	  DOJ	  conducted	  an	  average	  of	  three	  FCPA	  cases	  a	  year.	  21	  	  In	  
contrast,	  by	  2007,	  the	  DOJ	  brought	  more	  than	  sixty	  investigations	  per	  year,22	  as	  2009,	  the	  DOJ	  convicted	  
50	  individuals	  for	  FCPA	  violations,23	  and	  in	  2010	  seventy-­‐four	  investigations	  were	  initiated	  and	  at	  least	  
eight	  FCPA-­‐related	  settlements	  were	  reached.24	  	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  DOJ	  and	  the	  SEC	  have	  
demonstrated	  more	  interest	  in	  investigating	  FCPA	  violations.25	  	  Since	  2013,	  the	  DOJ	  has	  brought	  FCPA	  
cases	  against	  21	  corporations,26	  charged	  against	  or	  plead	  out	  25	  individuals,	  and	  obtain	  penalties	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Enforcement	  Division	  of	  the	  US	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  and	  Criminal	  Division	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  
FCPA	  A	  Resource	  Guide	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Corrupt	  Practices	  Act,	  2012,	  2-­‐4.	  
15	  Juedes,	  Dieter,	  Taming	  the	  FCPA	  Overreach	  through	  an	  Adequate	  Procedures	  Defense,	  4	  Wm.	  &	  Mary	  Bus.	  L.	  Rev.	  40	  (2012-­‐
2013),	  40	  
16	  Crites,	  D.	  Michael,	  The	  Foreign	  Corrupt	  Practices	  Act	  at	  Thirty-­‐Five:	  A	  Practitioner's	  Guide	  (	  73	  Ohio	  St.	  L.J.	  1058,	  2012),	  1058.	  	  
17	  As	  an	  example,	  the	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  are	  working	  to	  address	  corruption	  in	  other	  
countries	  through	  anti-­‐corruption	  and	  good	  governance	  initiatives.	  In	  addition,	  both	  departments	  have	  assisted	  U.S.	  
corporations	  doing	  business	  abroad.	  	  	  
18	  Enforcement	  Division	  of	  the	  US	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  and	  Criminal	  Division	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  
FCPA	  A	  Resource	  Guide	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Corrupt	  Practices	  Act,2012,	  page	  4	  
19	  Koehler,	  Mike,	  Big,	  Bold,	  and	  Bizarre:	  The	  Foreign	  Corrupt	  Practices	  Act	  Enters	  a	  New	  Era,	  43	  U.	  Tol.	  L.	  Rev.	  108	  (2011-­‐2012),	  
108	  
20	  Willborn,	  Emily	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  Extraterritorial	  Enforcement	  and	  Prosecutorial	  Discretion	  in	  the	  FCPA:	  A	  Call	  for	  International	  Prosecutorial	  
Factors,	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  Minn.	  J.	  Int'l	  L.	  428	  (2013),	  428	  
21	  Willborn,	  Emily	  ,	  Extraterritorial	  Enforcement	  and	  Prosecutorial	  Discretion	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  FCPA:	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  Call	  for	  International	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approximately	  $800	  million.27	  	  This	  change	  is	  the	  result	  of	  multiple	  factors	  such	  as:	  (a)	  the	  increase	  of	  
global	  business	  transactions	  (b)	  the	  recent	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  and	  (c)	  the	  multiple	  U.S.	  corporate	  
scandals.28	  	  
Although	  many	  corporations	  and	  individuals	  have	  been	  prosecuted	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  SEC	  and	  DOJ’s	  joint	  
investigations,	  most	  of	  them	  result	  in	  settlement	  agreements.	  	  Sanctions	  imposed	  by	  the	  SEC	  and	  the	  
DOJ	  made	  US	  corporations	  aware	  of	  the	  monetary	  and	  reputational	  consequences	  of	  these	  
investigations.29	  	  Therefore,	  corporations	  prefer	  to	  settle	  or	  plead	  guilty	  once	  they	  are	  faced	  with	  
possible	  FCPA	  charges,	  instead	  of	  enduring	  the	  prosecution	  process.30	  	  In	  the	  U.S	  more	  than	  88%	  of	  
criminal	  foreign	  bribery	  and	  related	  cases	  have	  been	  resolved	  by	  settlement,	  whereas	  only	  about	  12	  
percent	  have	  proceeded	  to	  trial.31	  	  Recently,	  Siemens,	  Ralph	  Lauren	  Corporation,	  Tyco,	  Hewlett	  Packard,	  
and	  ALCOA	  corporations	  paid	  millions	  of	  dollars	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government	  in	  settlement	  agreements.32	  	  
Other	  settlements	  reached	  between	  1999	  and	  2012	  resulted	  more	  than	  $5.7	  a	  billion	  in	  monetary	  
sanctions	  of	  corporations.	  33	  	  
However,	  the	  funds	  resulting	  from	  these	  settlements	  seldom	  return	  to	  the	  nations	  that	  were	  affected	  by	  
the	  bribes.	  	  The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  Against	  Corruption	  (UNCAC)	  establishes	  as	  one	  of	  its	  
fundamental	  principles	  the	  return	  of	  assets	  to	  their	  countries.34	  	  However,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  
only	  3.3%	  of	  the	  $6	  billion	  dollars	  in	  sanction	  have	  been	  ordered	  to	  return	  or	  effectively	  returned	  to	  
those	  countries	  were	  officials	  were	  bribed.35	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  monetary	  sanctions	  imposed	  have	  
stayed	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  those	  countries	  imposing	  the	  sanctions	  or	  countries	  where	  the	  
corporations	  are	  headquartered,	  such	  as	  the	  US.	  	  Nearly	  $6	  billion	  dollars	  in	  monetary	  sanctions	  have	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been	  imposed	  by	  bribe	  originating	  countries.36	  	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  funds	  have	  remained	  in	  the	  US	  could	  
be	  traced	  to	  the	  history,	  goals	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	  FCPA.	  
	  
Origins	  and	  development	  of	  the	  FCPA	  
The	  FCPA	  was	  enacted	  in	  1977	  to	  address	  bribe	  payments	  made	  to	  foreign	  government	  officials	  by	  
American	  corporations	  or	  individuals.37	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  these	  payments	  were	  made	  to	  foreign	  
government	  officials	  to	  obtain	  or	  retain	  business.38	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  FCPA,	  bribing	  foreign	  
officials	  was	  not	  expressly	  prohibited	  by	  US	  legislation.39	  	  Although	  there	  were	  some	  laws	  to	  control	  
improper	  activities	  by	  Americans	  abroad,	  as	  the	  Wire	  Fraud	  Statute	  and	  the	  Mail	  Fraud	  Act,	  none	  
addressed	  the	  payment	  of	  bribes	  to	  foreign	  officials.40	  	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  legislation	  to	  address	  this	  
issue,	  payments	  made	  by	  many	  American	  corporations	  to	  foreign	  officials	  were	  of	  public	  knowledge.41	  	  
Evidence	  suggests	  that	  US	  government	  agencies	  like	  the	  Department	  of	  Sate	  (DOS)	  and	  the	  Department	  
of	  Defense	  (DOD)	  were	  aware	  of	  these	  bribes	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  even	  provided	  information	  as	  to	  whom	  
and	  how	  much	  to	  pay.42	  
The	  FCPA	  criminalized	  foreign	  bribery	  and	  created	  special	  accounting	  provisions	  to	  address	  the	  
corresponding	  accounting	  irregularities	  generated	  by	  the	  payment	  of	  bribes	  i.e.	  the	  resulting	  inaccuracy	  
of	  business	  books	  and	  records	  of	  corporations.43	  	  Two	  main	  provisions	  are	  the	  driving	  force	  of	  the	  FCPA:	  
(a)	  an	  enforcement	  mechanism	  that	  criminalizes	  the	  payment	  of	  bribes	  to	  foreign	  government	  officials,	  
enforced	  by	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Justice	  (DOJ);44	  and	  (b)	  an	  accounting	  requirement	  to	  properly	  reflect	  
transactions	  in	  order	  to	  help	  prevent	  corruption,	  45	  designed	  as	  a	  civil	  enforcement	  tool	  entrusted	  to	  the	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US	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  (SEC).46	  	  The	  first	  provision	  establishes	  the	  criminal	  
enforcement	  mechanism,	  prohibits	  US	  corporations	  to	  give	  anything	  of	  value	  to	  foreign	  government	  
officials	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  or	  retaining	  business	  with	  a	  broad	  understanding	  of	  jurisdiction.47	  
The	  second	  provision,	  civil	  in	  nature	  and	  known	  as	  the	  books	  and	  records	  provision,	  requires	  US	  issuers48	  
to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  internal	  controls	  including	  accounting	  standards	  (maintain	  records,	  books	  and	  
accounts	  in	  detail	  and	  reflecting	  the	  real	  transactions	  of	  the	  corporation)	  to	  avoid	  violations.	  49	  	  	  
The	  US	  was	  the	  first	  nation50	  to	  pass	  legislation	  prohibiting	  bribery	  of	  foreign	  official	  and	  setting	  clear	  
rules	  regarding	  proper	  keeping	  of	  financial	  books	  and	  records	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  type	  of	  activity.51	  	  The	  
US	  Congress	  had	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  to	  pass	  the	  FCPA,	  among	  which	  was	  to	  create	  an	  “alliance-­‐
building”	  instrument	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  developing	  countries.52	  During	  1976,	  prior	  to	  the	  enactment	  
of	  the	  FCPA,	  the	  press	  exposed	  multiple	  corruption	  scandals	  such	  as	  Watergate	  and	  the	  Bananagate.	  	  
These	  exposés	  led	  to	  congressional	  hearings	  on	  the	  activities	  of	  US	  corporations	  abroad53	  and	  
investigations	  by	  different	  agencies.	  The	  apparent	  widespread	  surge	  of	  corporate	  foreign	  bribery	  and	  its	  
exposure	  by	  Congress,	  the	  SEC,	  and	  DOJ	  investigations	  became	  part	  of	  the	  motivation	  for	  Congress	  to	  
enact	  the	  FCPA.54	  	  Additionally,	  foreign	  policy	  considerations,	  such	  as	  multiple	  bribes	  paid	  by	  American	  
corporations	  operating	  abroad	  that	  could	  have	  inadvertently	  linked	  bribe	  payers	  to	  the	  US	  government55	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  company.	  	  The	  Editorial	  of	  the	  Washington	  Post	  warns	  of	  the	  perceive	  link	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  the	  
Lockheed	  as	  a	  bribe-­‐payer	  and	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  fact	  that	  at	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  time	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and	  the	  battle	  between	  capitalism	  vs.	  communism,	  were	  key	  factors	  to	  the	  discussion	  that	  led	  Congress	  
to	  embark	  in	  this	  effort.56	  
The	  Watergate	  scandal	  was	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  main	  drivers	  for	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  FCPA.57	  	  President	  
Nixon’s	  re-­‐election	  campaign	  was	  subject	  to	  an	  investigation	  for	  alleged	  illegal	  contributions	  by	  
corporate	  executives.58	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  SEC	  and	  the	  Attorney	  General’s	  Office	  conducted	  subsequent	  
inquiries	  into	  the	  illegal	  payments	  made	  by	  US	  corporations.59	  	  The	  US	  Attorney	  General	  appointed	  a	  
Special	  Prosecutor	  (the	  Watergate	  Special	  Prosecutor)	  to	  investigate	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  payments	  made	  
by	  US	  corporations	  to	  foreign	  government	  officials.60	  	  The	  Watergate	  Special	  Prosecutor	  and	  Congress	  
directed	  their	  investigation	  to	  determine	  the	  legality	  of	  these	  questionable	  payments.61	  	  
Following	  the	  Watergate	  scandal,	  the	  SEC	  also	  opened	  a	  series	  of	  investigations.	  The	  SEC	  evaluated	  the	  
issue	  of	  contributions	  from	  a	  different	  perspective	  than	  that	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	  Watergate	  Special	  
Prosecutor.	  	  The	  SEC	  investigation	  concentrated	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  corporations	  did	  not	  disclose	  to	  
their	  investors	  the	  questionable	  payments.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  SEC	  tried	  to	  identify	  the	  mechanisms	  used	  
by	  these	  corporations	  to	  document	  the	  illegal	  payments	  in	  their	  books	  and	  records.62	  	  The	  investigations	  
by	  the	  SEC	  and	  the	  Watergate	  Special	  Prosecutors	  uncovered	  that	  hundreds	  of	  US	  corporations	  had	  
spent	  millions	  of	  dollars	  bribing	  foreign	  government	  officials.63	  	  The	  inquiries	  exposed	  the	  use	  of	  secret	  
slush	  funds	  to	  make	  the	  illegal	  payments.64	  	  In	  addition,	  these	  corporations	  had	  falsified	  their	  corporate	  
financial	  records,	  disguising	  or	  concealing	  the	  source	  and	  illegal	  use	  of	  these	  funds.	  65	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Bananagate	  scandal	  contributed	  as	  an	  additional	  consideration	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  FCPA.66	  	  In	  
1975,	  the	  President	  and	  CEO	  of	  the	  United	  Brands	  Company,	  a	  major	  importer	  of	  bananas	  to	  the	  US,	  
jumped	  from	  a	  New	  York	  City	  building	  window	  falling	  to	  his	  death.67	  	  The	  suicide	  investigation	  revealed	  
that	  the	  CEO	  authorized	  payments	  to	  the	  President	  of	  Honduras	  to	  reduce	  taxes	  on	  banana	  exports.68	  
This	  scandal	  exposed	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  practice	  used	  by	  US	  companies	  to	  further	  their	  business	  agenda	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by	  paying	  bribes	  to	  foreign	  officials	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  lack	  of	  legislation	  to	  prevent	  or	  punish	  
this	  type	  of	  conduct.69	  	  
The	  investigations	  of	  the	  Bananagate	  scandal	  led	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  additional	  questionable	  activities	  by	  
the	  Lockheed	  Corporation.70	  	  In	  1976,	  after	  the	  post-­‐Watergate	  and	  Bananagate	  scandal	  investigations	  
led	  by	  the	  SEC,	  the	  media	  reported71	  that	  US	  government	  contractors-­‐-­‐including	  the	  Lockheed	  
Corporation72-­‐-­‐	  had	  bribed	  several	  government	  officials	  in	  Japan,	  Italy,	  Republic	  of	  Korea,	  and	  the	  
Netherlands.73	  	  Lockheed	  officials	  admitted	  paying	  bribes	  to	  Japanese	  executives	  and	  government	  
officials	  to	  promote	  Lockheed	  aircraft	  sales	  in	  that	  country.74	  	  The	  corporation	  argued	  that	  bribe	  
payments	  were	  customary	  in	  these	  countries.75	  	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  Lockheed	  case,	  the	  former	  
Japanese	  Prime	  Minister,	  other	  Japanese	  politicians	  and	  two	  former	  Italian	  defense	  ministers	  were	  
arrested.76	  	  This	  led	  to	  serious	  questioning	  by	  the	  public	  in	  the	  US,	  like	  a	  stern	  editorial	  of	  the	  
Washington	  Post	  in	  1976	  requesting	  concrete	  action	  by	  US	  authorities.77	  
The	  US	  Congress	  also	  took	  foreign	  policy	  into	  consideration	  for	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  FCPA.	  	  Given	  that	  
at	  the	  time	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  in	  full	  force,	  US	  Officials	  feared	  that	  if	  examples	  of	  foreign	  bribery	  by	  US	  
corporations—such	  as	  defense	  contractors—were	  made	  public,	  it	  could	  reaffirm	  communist	  assertions	  
that	  the	  US	  was	  made	  of	  greedy	  socially	  destructive	  capitalists.78	  	  The	  US	  Congress	  gave	  special	  attention	  
to	  bribery	  payments	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  made	  in	  Italy,	  and	  the	  political	  consequences	  that	  they	  could	  
bring.79	  	  The	  worry	  at	  the	  time	  was	  that	  these	  bribes	  could	  threaten	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  US	  as	  an	  
advocate	  of	  democracy	  and	  jeopardize	  US	  alliances	  around	  the	  world.80	  	  The	  US	  decided	  that	  it	  was	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necessary	  to	  create	  legislation	  to	  address	  ethical	  business	  practices	  related	  to	  bribery	  of	  foreign	  officials	  
to	  build	  and	  maintain	  economic	  and	  political	  alliances	  with	  developing	  countries,	  and	  represent	  its	  
democratic	  values	  around	  the	  world.	  81	  	  Congress	  resolved	  to	  foster	  worldwide	  consumer	  confidence	  in	  
US	  corporations	  by	  promoting	  morally	  sound	  business	  practices	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  US	  corporations	  in	  other	  
countries.82	  	  Senator	  Frank	  Church	  and	  Representative	  Robert	  Nix83	  held	  multiple	  hearings	  to	  create	  an	  
appropriate	  solution	  for	  this	  issue.84	  	  Discussions	  focused	  on	  two	  options:	  (a)	  establishing	  a	  system	  of	  US	  
reporting	  and	  disclosure	  to	  discourage	  questionable	  payments	  and	  advocate	  for	  proper	  record	  keeping	  
and	  accounting;	  or	  (b)	  criminalizing	  bribes	  paid	  to	  foreign	  officials.85	  	  The	  former	  implied	  that	  bribing	  a	  
foreign	  government	  official	  was	  legal	  as	  long	  as	  it	  was	  disclosed	  to	  US	  authorities.	  	  This	  option	  was	  not	  
considered	  to	  be	  the	  best	  approach.86	  	  The	  US	  Congress	  opted	  for	  the	  second	  alternative,	  creating	  a	  
deterrence	  factor	  by	  criminalizing	  bribery	  with	  direct	  enforceable	  measures.	  
Up	  to	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  FCPA’s	  owed	  its	  existence	  to	  press	  exposés,	  the	  perception	  
of	  wrongness	  of	  US	  business	  actions	  abroad	  and	  its	  harmful	  foreign	  policy	  implications.	  	  However,	  it	  was	  
US	  businesses	  that	  helped	  transform	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the raison d'être	  of	  the	  FCPA	  to	  the	  widely	  used	  
term	  “leveling	  the	  playing	  field”	  by	  influencing	  changes	  to	  the	  law.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  FCPA	  was	  modified	  twice	  
since	  its	  inception.	  	  First	  in	  1988	  the	  Omnibus	  Trade	  and	  Competitiveness	  Act	  of	  1988	  (OTCA)	  87	  and	  then	  
in	  1998	  by	  the	  International	  Anti-­‐Bribery	  Act.88	  	  The	  amendments	  introduced	  by	  the	  OTCA	  included	  as	  
subject	  to	  the	  law	  issuers	  of	  securities,	  domestic	  concerns,	  and	  the	  officers,	  director,	  employees,	  agents,	  
or	  stockholders	  of	  either	  issuers	  or	  domestic	  concerns.	  	  The	  modifications	  addressed	  made	  by	  OTCA	  
responded	  to	  concerns	  raised	  by	  American	  corporations	  after	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  FCPA.89	  	  One	  of	  
these	  concerns	  was	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  FCPA	  compromised	  American	  corporations’	  
competitiveness	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  foreign	  businesses.90	  	  Corporate	  America	  argued	  that	  foreign	  companies	  were	  
not	  subjected	  to	  the	  same	  guidelines	  and	  limits	  while	  operating	  abroad.91	  	  Non-­‐regulated	  foreign	  US	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competitors	  paying	  bribes	  were	  even	  allowed	  to	  claim	  these	  payments	  as	  tax	  deductions.	  92	  	  American	  
companies	  pleaded	  that	  they	  risked	  losing	  important	  sales,	  transactions,	  and	  investment	  opportunities93	  
due	  to	  the	  lax	  stance	  of	  some	  foreign	  jurisdictions	  in	  relation	  to	  foreign	  bribery.	  	  In	  fact,	  until	  1997	  in	  
some	  European	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany,	  businesses	  were	  allowed	  to	  deduct	  briberies	  from	  their	  
taxes	  as	  part	  of	  their	  business	  costs.	  	  Bribe	  payments	  were	  deductible	  as	  “useful	  expenditures”	  for	  the	  
company94	  and	  commonly	  accepted	  as	  a	  Gentlemen’s	  Agreement.95	  
This	  led	  the	  US	  Congress	  to	  entice	  foreign	  allies	  to	  adopt	  similar	  legislations.96	  	  Specifically,	  the	  OTCA	  
established	  the	  following:	  
“It	  is	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  Congress	  that	  the	  President	  should	  pursue	  the	  negotiation	  of	  an	  
international	  agreement,	  among	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Organization	  of	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  
Development,	  to	  govern	  persons	  from	  those	  countries	  concerning	  acts	  prohibited	  with	  respect	  
to	  issuers	  and	  domestic	  concerns	  by	  the	  amendments	  made	  by	  this	  section.	  Such	  international	  
agreement	  should	  include	  a	  process	  by	  which	  problems	  and	  conflicts	  associated	  with	  such	  acts	  
could	  be	  resolved.”97	  
	  
In	  addition,	  the	  law	  required	  the	  President	  to	  report	  to	  Congress	  on:	  	  
	  
“(i)	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  negotiations	  referred	  [above]	  […],	  (ii)	  those	  steps	  which	  the	  executive	  
branch	  and	  the	  Congress	  should	  consider	  taking	  in	  the	  event	  that	  these	  negotiations	  do	  not	  
successfully	  eliminate	  any	  competitive	  disadvantage	  of	  United	  States	  businesses	  that	  results	  
when	  persons	  from	  other	  countries	  commit	  the	  acts	  described	  in	  paragraph	  (1);	  and	  (iii)	  possible	  
actions	  that	  could	  be	  taken	  to	  promote	  cooperation	  by	  other	  countries	  in	  international	  efforts	  to	  
prevent	  bribery	  of	  foreign	  officials,	  candidates,	  or	  parties	  in	  third	  countries.”	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13	  
	  
This	  Act	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  FCPA	  may	  have	  created	  a	  potential	  trade	  disadvantage	  and	  therefore	  the	  
“playing	  field”	  for	  American	  corporations	  had	  to	  be	  leveled.	  	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  precursors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  
OECD	  convention,	  as	  the	  US	  Government	  was	  mandated	  by	  Congress	  to	  pursue	  it.	  
The	  second	  modification	  to	  the	  FCPA	  occurred	  in	  1998,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  OECD	  
Convention.	  98	  	  In	  order	  to	  align	  the	  FCPA	  to	  the	  Convention,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  FCPA	  was	  expanded	  to	  
include	  some	  foreign	  nationals.	  99	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  reform	  added	  alternative	  basis	  for	  jurisdiction	  based	  
on	  nationality	  100	  (FCPA	  anti-­‐bribery	  provision	  have	  extraterritorial	  jurisdiction),	  101	  empowered	  the	  DOJ	  
allowing	  it	  to	  subpoena	  witnesses	  and	  documents	  in	  certain	  civil	  investigations,	  102	  and	  expanded	  the	  
reach	  of	  US	  authorities	  outside	  of	  US	  territory.103	  	  
	  
The	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  Public	  Officials	  Act	  
The	  Canadian	  Corruption	  of	  Foreign	  Public	  Officials	  Act	  (CFPOA)	  
As	  outlined	  above,	  the	  FCPA	  was	  brought	  about	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  national	  corruption	  scandals	  
and	  allegations	  of	  bribes	  paid	  by	  US	  companies	  abroad,	  which	  together	  precipitated	  a	  change	  in	  social	  
attitudes	  towards	  punishment	  and	  deterrence	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  corrupt	  acts	  and	  a	  great	  concern	  
by	  US	  Congress	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  implications	  of	  bribery	  to	  foreign	  public	  officials	  by	  American	  
corporations.	  	  After	  the	  FCPA	  enactment,	  US	  corporations	  advocated	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  similar	  
legislation	  around	  the	  globe	  in	  order	  to	  “level	  the	  playing	  field,”	  a	  sentiment	  that	  was	  captured	  by	  the	  
US	  Congress	  in	  OTCA,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  OECD	  Convention.	  	  Consequently,	  it	  was	  
Canada’s	  signing	  of	  the	  1997	  OECD	  Convention	  which	  led	  in	  1999	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Canadian	  
Corruption	  of	  Foreign	  Public	  Officials	  Act	  (CFPOA),	  22	  years	  after	  the	  FCPA,	  and	  11	  years	  after	  the	  OTCA.	  	  
However,	  unlike	  the	  FCPA	  enforcement	  in	  the	  US,	  there	  have	  been	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  cases	  pursued	  by	  
Canadian	  authorities	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  CFPOA.	  	  As	  a	  reference	  point,	  the	  US	  has	  had	  more	  than	  
270	  civil	  or	  criminal	  enforcement	  proceedings	  initiated	  since	  2007	  under	  the	  FCPA	  resulting	  in	  more	  
than	  $5.7	  billion	  in	  fines.104	  	  While	  Canada’s	  enforcement	  of	  the	  CFPOA	  may	  be	  in	  its	  infancy,	  it	  has	  not	  
gone	  unnoticed.	  	  It	  appears	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Canada’s	  enforcement	  actions	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years,	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Transparency	  International	  has	  moved	  Canada	  from	  the	  category	  of	  “little	  enforcement”	  to	  “moderate	  
enforcement”	  which	  includes	  countries	  that	  have	  at	  least	  one	  major	  case	  and	  active	  investigation.	  	  
	  
Notwithstanding	  this	  limited	  enforcement,	  Canadian	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  related	  to	  Canadian	  
companies	  have	  been	  recently	  at	  the	  center	  of	  attention	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  advocates,	  particularly	  after	  
the	  World	  Bank’s	  decision	  to	  debar	  SNC	  Lavalin	  for	  bribes	  paid	  in	  Bangladesh	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Padma	  Multipurpose	  Bridge	  Project,	  and	  ongoing	  investigations	  by	  Canadian	  authorities	  on	  other	  
dealings	  of	  the	  same	  company	  in	  Montreal,	  in	  Libya	  and	  Tunisia.105	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  opposed	  to	  its	  
American	  counterpart,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  CFPOA	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  much	  criticism.106	  	  The	  
critiques	  have	  focused	  primarily	  on	  the	  reticence	  of	  Canadian	  authorities	  to	  enforce	  the	  existing	  
legislation.	  
	  
The	  CFPOA	  provides	  for	  Canadian	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  bribery	  of	  foreign	  public	  officials	  only	  when	  a	  
listed	  offense	  has	  a	  real	  and	  substantial	  connection	  to	  the	  territory	  of	  Canada.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
offense	  must	  occur	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  larger	  part	  in	  Canada.107	  	  A	  close	  look	  at	  the	  CFPOA,	  in	  particular,	  
section	  3	  (1)	  which	  defines	  the	  offence	  of	  bribing	  a	  public	  official,	  illustrates	  that	  its	  purpose	  is	  
specifically	  the	  punishment	  of	  individuals	  who	  bribe	  or	  attempt	  to	  bribe	  a	  foreign	  public	  official.	  
Violation	  of	  the	  CFPOA	  is	  an	  extraditable	  offense	  and	  is	  punishable,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  individual,	  by	  
imprisonment	  for	  up	  to	  14	  years	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  fines	  imposed	  in	  addition	  to	  imprisonment.	  	  This	  
means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  availability	  of	  a	  conditional	  sentence	  or	  discharge	  for	  the	  offense	  of	  bribing	  a	  
foreign	  public	  official.	  	  The	  standard	  of	  proof	  for	  the	  offense	  is	  “beyond	  a	  reasonable	  doubt”	  since	  the	  
offense	  is	  criminal.	  	  
	  
Prior	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  CFPOA,	  there	  were	  several	  missed	  opportunities	  to	  pursue	  corruption	  
cases	  in	  Canada.	  	  One	  glaring	  example	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Acres	  International.	  	  Acres	  
International,	  a	  civil	  engineering	  firm,	  which	  together	  with	  Lahmeyer	  International	  GmbH	  (Germany),	  
Impregilo	  SpA	  (Italy),	  and	  Spie	  Batignolles	  (France),	  were	  found	  guilty	  by	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Lesotho	  of	  
acts	  of	  corruption,	  which	  occurred	  in	  the	  1990’s	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Lesotho	  Highlands	  Project.108	  	  In	  2002,	  
Acres	  International	  was	  found	  guilty	  of	  bribing	  the	  chief	  executive	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  $8	  billion	  Lesotho	  
Highlands	  Water	  Project,	  through	  an	  intermediary.	  	  Masupha	  Ephraim	  Sole,	  the	  executive	  who	  had	  
accepted	  bribes	  from	  Acres	  and	  several	  other	  major	  international	  infrastructure	  companies,	  was	  
sentenced	  to	  15	  years	  in	  prison,	  on	  evidence	  obtained	  through	  a	  Swiss	  court	  order	  to	  disclose	  Sole’s	  
secret	  bank	  accounts.	  	  The	  conviction	  was	  upheld	  by	  the	  country’s	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  in	  2003.	  	  The	  
Lesotho	  courts	  efficiently	  took	  action	  and	  ordered	  the	  parties	  to	  pay	  substantial	  fines.109	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  As	  part	  of	  a	  Negotiated	  Resolution	  Agreement	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  and	  SNC-­‐Lavalin,	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  
debarred	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  and	  over	  100	  of	  its	  affiliates	  for	  a	  period	  of	  10	  years.	  	  Under	  this	  agreement,	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  and	  its	  affiliates	  
committed	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  World	  Bank's	  Integrity	  Vice	  Presidency	  and	  continue	  to	  improve	  their	  internal	  compliance	  
program.	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  was	  investigated	  for	  misconduct	  involving	  a	  conspiracy	  to	  pay	  bribes	  and	  misrepresentations	  when	  
bidding	  for	  Bank-­‐financed	  projects,	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  World	  Bank's	  procurement	  guidelines,	  online:	  
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-­‐release/2013/04/17/world-­‐bank-­‐debars-­‐snc-­‐lavalin-­‐inc-­‐and-­‐its-­‐affiliates-­‐for-­‐ten-­‐
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  Michael	  Osborne,	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  Foreign	  Anti-­‐Bribery	  Law,	  10,	  online:	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In	  2004,	  the	  World	  Bank	  followed	  suit	  and	  promptly	  debarred	  Acres	  International	  for	  three	  years.110	  	  The	  
Bank	  declared	  Acres	  ineligible	  to	  receive	  any	  new	  Bank-­‐financed	  contracts	  for	  a	  period	  of	  three	  years.	  	  
Following	  the	  Acres	  trial,	  the	  World	  Bank	  also	  found	  Lahmeyer	  International	  guilty	  of	  bribery.	  	  The	  World	  
Bank’s	  Sanctions	  Board111	  found	  that	  Lahmeyer	  had	  used	  the	  same	  intermediary	  as	  Acres.112	  	  However,	  
despite	  actions	  taken	  by	  Lesotho	  and	  the	  World	  Bank,	  no	  prosecution	  was	  initiated	  in	  Canada.	  	  While	  it	  
appears	  that	  Canadian	  law	  enforcement	  authorities	  opened	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  activities	  of	  Acres	  
International,	  the	  civil	  engineering	  firm	  was	  never	  charged	  or	  prosecuted	  in	  the	  judicial	  system.113	  	  	  
	  
Since	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  CFPOA,	  Canadian	  law	  enforcement	  and	  judicial	  authorities	  have	  pursued	  
several	  notable	  cases.	  	  What	  is	  noteworthy	  about	  this	  trend	  is	  that	  much	  like	  Canada’s	  adoption	  of	  the	  
CFPOA,	  its	  move	  towards	  greater	  national	  enforcement	  of	  this	  act	  was	  again,	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  
external	  international	  pressures	  by	  both	  the	  OECD	  and	  Transparency	  International.	  	  In	  March	  2011,	  the	  
OECD	  issued	  a	  report	  on	  Canada’s	  implementation	  of	  the	  OECD	  convention	  (OECD	  Report).114	  	  The	  
report,	  which	  came	  12	  years	  after	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  CFPOA	  was	  quite	  scathing.	  	  Amongst	  other	  
observations,	  the	  OECD	  Committee	  found	  that	  Canada	  had	  only	  completed	  one	  prosecution	  since	  the	  
enactment	  of	  the	  CFPOA.	  	  The	  Committee	  noted	  that	  there	  were	  20	  open	  investigations	  and	  that	  credit	  
for	  these	  cases	  should	  be	  largely	  attributed	  to	  the	  RCMP	  International	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Unit,	  which	  had	  
been	  established	  in	  2008.115	  	  In	  2012,	  Transparency	  International	  issued	  its	  eighth	  annual	  progress	  
report	  on	  country	  implementation	  of	  the	  OECD	  convention	  and	  once	  again,	  criticized	  Canada	  for	  lack	  of	  
enforcement.116	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  after	  these	  reports,	  in	  particular	  the	  OECD	  Report,	  the	  
number	  of	  foreign	  bribery	  investigations	  in	  Canada	  increased	  from	  23	  in	  2010,	  to	  35	  in	  2013.	  	  What	  is	  
equally	  important	  is	  the	  change	  in	  judicial	  attitudes	  towards	  punishment	  of	  foreign	  corrupt	  acts	  within	  
the	  Canadian	  court	  system.	  
	  
Prior	  to	  the	  case	  of	  SNC-­‐Lavalin,	  there	  have	  been	  three	  cases	  that	  mark	  a	  shift	  in	  Canada’s	  
implementation	  of	  the	  CFPOA.	  	  The	  three	  cases	  which	  have	  received	  serious	  media	  attention	  in	  Canada	  
after	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  CFPOA	  and	  the	  OECD	  Report	  are	  Her	  Majesty	  the	  Queen	  vs.	  Niko	  Resources	  
Ltd.	  (Niko	  Resources);117	  Her	  Majesty	  the	  Queen	  vs.	  Griffiths	  Energy	  International	  Inc.	  (Griffiths)118	  and	  
Her	  Majesty	  the	  Queen	  vs.	  Karigar	  (Karigar).119	  	  These	  cases	  show	  a	  distinct	  trend	  towards	  a	  culture	  of	  
national	  investigations,	  prosecutions	  and	  punishment	  of	  companies	  who	  engage	  in	  corrupt	  practices	  
with	  foreign	  public	  officials.	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In	  brief,	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2011,	  Niko	  Resources,	  an	  Alberta	  based	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Company,	  plead	  guilty	  to	  
offences	  under	  the	  CFPOA	  and	  was	  forced	  to	  pay	  a	  $9.5	  million	  fine	  and	  a	  three	  year	  probation	  order,	  
pending	  implementation	  of	  a	  compliance	  program,	  for	  payments	  made	  to	  a	  foreign	  senior	  public	  official	  
in	  Bangladesh.	  	  Niko	  had	  given	  the	  Energy	  Minister	  of	  Bangladesh	  a	  payment	  of	  CAN$190,000	  dollars	  for	  
a	  vehicle	  for	  personal	  use	  as	  well	  as	  for	  trips	  to	  Calgary	  and	  New	  York	  following	  an	  explosion	  at	  one	  of	  
Niko’s	  natural	  gas	  fields	  in	  Bangladesh.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  payment,	  the	  Energy	  Minister	  had	  been	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  determining	  how	  much	  compensation	  was	  owed	  to	  Bangladesh	  villagers	  for	  water	  
contamination	  and	  other	  environmental	  concerns	  caused	  by	  the	  explosion.	  	  The	  Canadian	  media	  hailed	  
the	  decision	  a	  “wake	  up	  call”	  delivered	  to	  Canadian	  companies	  after	  Canada	  had	  been	  criticized	  for	  lax	  
enforcement	  of	  the	  CFPOA.120	  	  Media	  sources	  also	  called	  the	  case	  “the	  most	  significant	  development	  in	  
Canada’s	  efforts	  to	  fight	  foreign	  bribery	  since	  the	  1999	  implementation	  of	  the	  CFPOA."121	  	  
	  
On	  January	  22,	  2013,	  another	  Alberta	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  company	  was	  in	  the	  spotlight,	  when	  the	  Alberta	  Court	  
of	  Queens	  bench	  held	  that	  Griffiths	  would	  pay	  CAN$10.35	  million	  dollars	  penalty	  after	  it	  had	  been	  found	  
guilty	  of	  a	  bribe	  payment	  of	  CAN$2	  million	  dollars	  to	  a	  diplomat’s	  wife	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  lucrative	  
opportunities	  in	  Africa.122	  	  Both	  cases	  involved	  large	  companies	  whose	  primary	  business	  was	  the	  export	  
of	  oil	  and	  gas.	  	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  that	  Canada’s	  number	  one	  export	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years	  has	  
been	  oil	  and	  gas	  extraction.	  123	  	  
	  
More	  surprisingly	  is	  the	  fact	  that,	  both	  the	  Niko	  Resources	  and	  Griffiths	  cases	  were	  heard	  and	  
determined	  by	  the	  same	  judge:	  Justice	  Brooker	  of	  the	  Alberta	  Court	  of	  Queens	  Bench.	  	  Some	  may	  
suggest	  that	  the	  decisions	  were	  the	  work	  of	  a	  vigilant	  judge	  rather	  than	  a	  change	  in	  Canadian	  criminal	  
policy.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  our	  view	  that	  these	  two	  cases	  mark	  a	  move	  not	  only	  towards	  greater	  enforcement	  
of	  the	  CFPOA	  by	  the	  judiciary,	  but	  also	  demonstrates	  its	  judicial	  interpretation	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  punishment	  
of	  corrupt	  acts	  by	  individuals	  and	  companies.	  	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  part	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  
financial	  penalties	  imposed	  on	  the	  companies	  were	  more	  significant	  than	  the	  alleged	  bribes	  themselves.	  	  
This	  marks	  a	  notable	  shift	  towards	  punishment	  and	  deterrence	  as	  goals	  of	  the	  judicial	  system.	  	  What	  is	  
absent	  from	  either	  of	  the	  decisions	  is	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  ill	  effects	  of	  corruption	  on	  international	  
development	  or	  the	  affected	  country	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  fines.	  	  
	  
The	  third	  and	  most	  recent	  Canadian	  conviction	  was	  that	  of	  Karigar	  in	  August	  2013.	  	  The	  Superior	  Court	  
of	  Ontario	  convicted	  Nazir	  Karigar	  for	  conspiring	  to	  bribe	  Indian	  government	  officials	  with	  US450,000	  
dollars,	  following	  a	  failed	  attempt	  to	  secure	  an	  airline	  security	  contract	  valued	  at	  CAN$100	  million	  
dollars	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  a	  security	  system	  by	  Cryptometrics	  Canada,	  an	  Ottawa	  based	  technology	  
company.124	  	  	  Karigar	  was	  sentenced	  to	  three	  years	  in	  prison	  for	  conspiracy	  to	  bribe	  public	  officials	  in	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  Miller	  Thomson	  lawyers	  avocats,	  Kiselbach,	  Daniel	  L.	  and	  Truman,	  Richard,	  Canada's	  Corruption	  of	  Foreign	  Public	  Officials	  
Act:	  Niko	  Resources	  Ltd.	  Receives	  a	  $9.5	  Million	  Fine	  for	  Bribery(October2011),	  online:	  
<http://www.millerthomson.com/en/publications/newsletters/criminal-­‐law-­‐regulation-­‐enforcement/2011-­‐archives/october-­‐
2011/canadas-­‐corruption-­‐of-­‐foreign-­‐public>	  	  
121	  McCarthy	  Tetrault,	  John	  W.	  Boscariol,	  	  A	  Deeper	  Dive	  Into	  Canada’s	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  Significant	  Foreign	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  Niko	  Resources	  Ltd,	  
online:	  <http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=5640>	  	  
122	  Court	  of	  Queen’s	  Bench	  of	  Alberta,	  Judicial	  Centre	  of	  Calgary,	  Her	  Majesty	  the	  Queen	  v.	  Griffiths	  Energy	  International,	  E-­‐File	  
No.:CCQ13GRIFFITHSENER,	  Action	  No.	  130057425Q1,	  January	  25,	  2013.	  	  
123	  Government	  of	  Canada,	  Canadian	  Industry,	  Mining,	  Quarrying,	  and	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Extraction	  (NAICS	  21):	  International	  trade,	  
online:	  <https://www.ic.gc.ca/app/scr/sbms/sbb/cis/internationalTrade.html?code=21#int1>	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  111,	  Karigar.	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India.125	  	  The	  Karigar	  decision	  marks	  the	  first	  contested	  trial	  of	  a	  charge	  under	  the	  CFPOA	  and	  the	  first	  
conviction	  against	  an	  individual.	  	  Justice	  Hackland	  of	  the	  Ontario	  Superior	  Court,	  in	  relying	  on	  Article	  3(1)	  
of	  the	  CFPOA	  stated	  that	  a	  serious	  sentence	  was	  necessary	  in	  that:	  
	  	  
“Canada’s	  Treaty	  Obligations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  domestic	  case	  law	  from	  our	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
requires,	  in	  my	  view,	  that	  a	  sentence	  be	  pronounced	  that	  reflects	  the	  principals	  of	  deterrence	  
and	  denunciation	  of	  your	  conduct.	  	  Any	  person	  who	  proposes	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  sophisticated	  
scheme	  to	  bribe	  foreign	  public	  officials	  to	  promote	  the	  commercial	  or	  other	  interests	  of	  a	  
Canadian	  business	  abroad	  must	  appreciate	  that	  they	  will	  face	  a	  significant	  sentence	  of	  
incarceration	  in	  a	  Canadian	  penitentiary.”126	   
	  
Not	  only	  did	  Justice	  Hackland	  discuss	  deterrence	  and	  denunciation	  as	  underlying	  principles	  of	  the	  
CFPOA,	  but	  he	  also	  took	  judicial	  notice	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  international	  development	  goals	  when	  
considering	  corruption	  cases	  and	  appropriate	  penalties.	  To	  this	  effect,	  Justice	  Hackland	  stated	  the	  
following:	  
“…the	  corruption	  of	  foreign	  public	  officials,	  particularly	  in	  developing	  countries,	  is	  
enormously	  harmful	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  undermine	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  The	  idea	  that	  bribery	  is	  simply	  
a	  cost	  of	  doing	  business	  in	  many	  countries,	  and	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  such	  by	  Canadian	  firms	  
competing	  for	  business	  in	  those	  countries,	  must	  be	  disavowed."127	  
This	  connection	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  foreign	  bribery	  in	  developing	  countries	  became	  more	  relevant	  in	  the	  
SNC-­‐Lavalin	  case.	  	  In	  September	  2011,	  the	  RCMP	  raided	  the	  offices	  of	  Montreal	  based	  SNC-­‐Lavalin,	  in	  
connection	  with	  bribe	  payments	  made	  during	  its	  bid	  to	  supervise	  the	  contractor	  responsible	  for	  the	  
construction	  of	  a	  multi-­‐billion	  dollar	  bridge	  in	  Bangladesh.128	  	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  is	  one	  of	  the	  10	  largest	  
engineering	  and	  construction	  firms	  in	  the	  world	  with	  significant	  presence	  in	  developing	  countries	  and	  a	  
good	  history	  of	  contracts	  with	  international	  development	  agencies	  and	  MDBs.	  	  	  
The	  Canadian	  courts	  took	  action	  rapidly	  and	  in	  2012,	  former	  engineer	  Mohammad	  Ismail	  and	  former	  
Executive	  Vice-­‐President	  Ramesh	  Shah	  were	  charged	  with	  bribing	  officials	  in	  Bangladesh.	  	  They	  are	  
awaiting	  trails	  in	  Toronto.	  	  The	  former	  head	  of	  construction	  of	  the	  company	  was	  also	  arrested	  on	  
charges	  of	  corruption,	  fraud	  and	  money	  laundering	  in	  connection	  with	  dealings	  in	  North	  Africa.129 
On	  April	  17,	  2013	  and	  after	  a	  long	  investigation,	  the	  WBG	  announced	  the	  debarment	  of	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  Inc.-­‐
-­‐in	  addition	  to	  over	  100	  affiliates-­‐-­‐for	  a	  period	  of	  10	  years	  following	  the	  company’s	  misconduct	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  Padma	  Multipurpose	  Bridge	  Project	  in	  Bangladesh,	  all	  part	  of	  a	  Negotiated	  Resolution	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  Rob	  Currie,	  International	  and	  Transnational	  Criminal	  Law-­‐First	  Canadian	  Trial	  and	  Conviction	  Under	  Anti-­‐Corruption(October	  
18,	  2013),	  online:	  <http://rjcurrie.typepad.com/international-­‐and-­‐transna/2013/10/first-­‐canadian-­‐trial-­‐and-­‐conviction-­‐under-­‐
anti-­‐corruption-­‐law.html>	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  Supra	  note	  11,	  Karigar.	  	  
127Supra	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  Karigar,	  para.	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128	  Samuel	  Rubenfeld	  &	  Joe	  Palazzolo,	  “Mounties	  Raid	  SNC	  Lavin	  in	  Corruption	  Probe”,	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (September	  2,	  
2011),	  online:	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129	  Critiques	  of	  Canada’s	  enforcement	  measures	  should	  not	  be	  too	  severe.	  As	  of	  October	  30,	  2014,	  a	  Dhaka	  court	  acquitted	  all	  
seven	  defendants	  accused	  of	  taking	  bribes	  from	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  Padma	  Bridge	  Project.	  (Richard	  L.	  Cassin,	  
Victim’	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  collects	  $13	  million	  in	  recovered	  funds.	  online:	  <http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/tag/snc-­‐lavalin>)	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Agreement	  between	  the	  WBG	  and	  the	  corporation.130	  	  Under	  the	  Agreement,	  the	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  Group	  and	  
its	  affiliates	  committed	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  Integrity	  Vice	  Presidency	  (INT)	  and	  
continuing	  to	  improve	  their	  internal	  compliance	  program.	  	  The	  debarment	  of	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  Inc.	  qualified	  
for	  cross-­‐debarment	  by	  other	  MDBs	  under	  the	  Agreement	  of	  Mutual	  Recognition	  of	  Debarments	  (Cross-­‐
Debarment	  Agreement)131	  that	  was	  signed	  on	  April	  9,	  2010,	  and	  consequently	  was	  accepted	  by	  other	  
MDBs	  like	  the	  IDB. 
	  
It	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  discussions	  regarding	  Niko	  Resources,	  Griffiths	  and	  Karigar,	  that	  the	  case	  of	  SNC-­‐
Lavalin	  in	  not	  new.	  	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  due	  to	  its	  size	  and	  international	  influence,	  that	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  has	  
received	  more	  attention	  than	  its	  smaller	  Canadian	  counterparts.	  	  However,	  when	  looked	  at	  in	  context,	  
this	  case	  marks	  an	  evolution	  in	  Canadian	  investigations	  and	  judicial	  decisions	  that	  have	  moved	  towards	  
enforcement	  and	  punishment	  of	  individuals	  and	  companies	  under	  the	  CFPOA.	  	  What	  is	  different	  with	  
SNC-­‐Lavalin	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  first	  time	  that	  Canadian	  authorities	  have	  so	  closely	  cooperated	  with	  an	  MDB	  
in	  an	  investigation.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  RCMP	  reportedly	  initiated	  its	  investigation	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  WBG,	  
which	  had	  itself	  lend	  US1.2	  billion	  dollars	  to	  the	  government	  of	  Bangladesh	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  
bridge,	  and	  subsequently	  investigated	  and	  debarred	  the	  corporation	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  matter.	  
	  
Corruption	  in	  development	  projects:	  intersection	  of	  the	  investigations	  and	  sanctions	  imposed	  
by	  MDB’s	  and	  actions	  taken	  by	  national	  authorities	  
The	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  case	  is	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  salient	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  collaboration	  between	  and	  
MDBs	  and	  a	  national	  authorities	  materializes.	  	  However,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  two	  investigations	  and	  
subsequent	  procedures	  against	  the	  corporations	  and/or	  its	  executives	  is	  fundamentally	  different.	  	  
Whereas	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FCPA,	  US	  authorities	  carry	  out	  criminal	  and	  civil	  investigations	  in	  relation	  to	  
foreign	  corrupt	  practices,	  Canadian	  authorities	  seem	  to	  carry	  only	  criminal	  actions	  against	  CFCPA	  
offenders.	  	  Both	  systems	  conform	  to	  the	  mandates	  emanating	  from	  the	  OECD	  Convention.	  	  In	  the	  case	  
of	  MDBs	  investigations	  and	  sanctions	  procedures	  are	  clearly	  administrative	  in	  nature	  and	  rooted	  within	  
the	  principals	  of	  Global	  Administrative	  Law.132	  
To	  the	  effect	  of	  understanding	  the	  differences	  between	  national	  and	  MDB	  systems,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
track	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption	  in	  MDBs	  back	  to	  1996,	  when	  the	  first	  international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  “World	  Bank	  Debars	  SNC	  Lavalin	  and	  its	  Affiliates	  for	  10	  years”,	  The	  World	  Bank	  (April	  17,	  2013)	  online:	  
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-­‐release/2013/04/17/world-­‐bank-­‐debars-­‐snc-­‐lavalin-­‐inc-­‐and-­‐its-­‐affiliates-­‐for-­‐ten-­‐
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131	  The	  participating	  institutions	  to	  the	  IFI’s	  Agreement	  for	  Mutual	  Enforcement	  of	  Debarment	  Decisions	  (Cross-­‐debarment	  
Agreement)	  are	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group,	  the	  African	  Development	  Bank	  Group,	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank,	  the	  European	  Bank	  
for	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  and	  the	  IDB	  Group.	  	  The	  IFI’s	  Cross-­‐debarment	  Agreement	  provides	  that,	  subject	  to	  the	  
prerequisite	  conditions	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  IFI’s	  Cross-­‐debarment	  Agreement,	  unless	  a	  participating	  IFI	  (i)	  believes	  that	  any	  of	  the	  
prerequisite	  conditions	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  IFI’s	  Cross-­‐debarment	  Agreement	  have	  not	  been	  met	  or	  (ii)	  decides	  to	  exercise	  its	  rights	  
under	  the	  “opt	  out”	  clause	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  IFI’s	  Cross-­‐debarment	  Agreement,	  each	  participating	  IFI	  will	  promptly	  enforce	  the	  
debarment	  decisions	  of	  the	  other	  participating	  IFI’s.   	  
132	  Pascale	  Helene	  Dubois	  and	  Ailen	  Elizabeth	  Nowlan.	  “Global	  Administrative	  Law	  and	  the	  Legitimacy	  of	  Sanctions	  Regimes	  in	  
International	  Law.”	  The	  Yale	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  Online.	  Fall	  2010,	  Vol.	  36.	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acknowledgement	  of	  the	  extent	  and	  pervasiveness	  of	  corruption	  in	  international	  development	  was	  
provided	  by	  then-­‐World	  Bank	  President	  James	  D.	  Wolfensohn	  during	  his	  speech	  at	  the	  annual	  meetings	  
of	  the	  WBG	  and	  International	  Monetary	  Fund133	  
The	  first	  investigative	  unit	  and	  administrative	  adjudicative	  system	  was	  created	  at	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  
1998,	  which	  was	  subsequently	  modified	  in	  2002	  after	  two	  reviews	  conducted	  by	  the	  former	  Under-­‐
Secretary	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  a	  former	  Attorney	  General	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Richard	  Thornburgh	  
(January	  2000	  and	  August	  2002).134	  	  These	  reviews	  were	  later	  complemented	  by	  the	  work	  conducted	  by	  
an	  independent	  Panel	  chaired	  by	  former	  US	  Federal	  Reserve	  Chair,	  Mr.	  Paul	  Volcker,	  which	  framed	  the	  
World	  Bank’s	  current	  debarment	  and	  suspension	  system.	  	  In	  2001,	  the	  IDB	  adopted	  a	  similar	  system	  to	  
that	  of	  the	  WBG.	  	  Mr.	  Thornburgh	  reviewed	  the	  IDB	  system	  in	  2008	  in	  his	  report	  “Concerning	  the	  Anti-­‐
Corruption	  Framework	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  (IDB).”135	  	  The	  recommendations	  of	  this	  
report	  contained	  great	  similarities	  with	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  system,	  and	  were	  adopted	  by	  the	  IDB	  in	  2010.	  	  	  
Both	  the	  IDB	  and	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  systems	  were	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  US	  Federal	  Acquisition	  
Regulations	  (FAR)	  suspension	  and	  debarment	  system.136	  	  The	  FAR	  regulates	  the	  way	  in	  which	  US	  federal	  
agencies	  can	  exercise	  their	  discretion	  in	  deciding	  which	  contractors	  are	  not	  being	  presently	  responsible	  
and	  therefore	  can	  be	  excluded	  from	  participating	  in	  public	  procurement.	  The	  concept	  of	  present	  
responsibility	  provides	  the	  US	  Government	  with	  the	  necessary	  tools	  to	  avoid	  doing	  business	  with	  those	  
contractors	  or	  providers	  that	  have	  shown	  not	  to	  be	  responsible	  in	  fulfilling	  “…their	  legal	  or	  contractual	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  James	  D.	  Wolfensohn,	  Annual	  Meeting	  Speech,	  “Coalitions	  for	  Change”,	  World	  Bank	  Group	  and	  International	  Monetary	  
Fund,	  Boards	  of	  Governors,	  1992	  Annual	  Meetings	  (September	  28),	  online:	  
<http://www.imf.org/external/am/1999/speeches/pr02e.pdf>.	  	  Former	  president	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  said:	  “It	  is	  true	  that	  when	  I	  
came	  to	  the	  World	  Bank,	  I	  was	  given	  an	  admonition	  by	  our	  General	  Counsel	  that	  I	  should	  read	  the	  Articles	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  
agreements.	  	  In	  there	  it	  says	  I	  am	  to	  deal	  with	  economic	  matters	  and	  that	  as	  an	  international	  civil	  servant,	  I	  should	  not,	  if	  I	  want	  
to	  keep	  my	  job,	  talk	  about	  political	  matters.	  I	  was	  then	  told	  that	  there	  was	  one	  word	  I	  could	  not	  use,	  which	  was	  the	  "C"	  word,	  
the	  "C"	  word	  being	  "corruption".	  Corruption,	  you	  see,	  was	  identified	  with	  politics,	  and	  if	  I	  got	  into	  that,	  I	  would	  have	  a	  terrible	  
time	  with	  my	  Board.”	  James	  D.	  Wolfensohn,	  World	  Bank's	  President	  Remarks	  at	  the	  Global	  Forum	  on	  Fighting	  Corruption	  (U.S.	  
Government	  trans.,	  1999).	  	  Wolfensohn’s	  worry	  was	  later	  corroborated	  by	  a	  2004	  World	  Bank	  study	  that	  estimated	  the	  amount	  
of	  bribes	  paid	  worldwide	  to	  be	  “[…]	  more	  than	  $1	  trillion,	  or	  the	  equivalent	  of	  3	  percent	  of	  gross	  world	  product	  […].”	  Bhargava,	  
Curing	  the	  Cancer	  of	  Corruption.	  2006.Bhargava,	  Curing	  the	  Cancer	  of	  Corruption.	  2006.	  Bhargava,	  Curing	  the	  Cancer	  of	  
Corruption.	  2006.Bhargava,	  Curing	  the	  Cancer	  of	  Corruption.	  2006.	  	  Wolfensohn,	  World	  Bank's	  President	  Remarks	  at	  the	  Global	  
Forum	  on	  Fighting	  Corruption.	  1999.	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  L.;	  Walker,	  Cuyler	  H,	  Report	  to	  Shengman	  Zhang,	  Managing	  Director	  and	  Chairman	  of	  the	  
Oversight	  Committee	  on	  Fraud	  and	  Corruption	  concerning	  mechanisms	  to	  address	  problems	  of	  fraud	  and	  corruption,	  The	  World	  
Bank	  Annual	  Report,	  1991	  (January	  21,	  2000),	  online:	  <http://www-­‐
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/08/05/000160016_20040805171318/Rendered/PDF/
29755.pdf>	  (First	  Report).	  Thornburg,	  Dick;	  Gainer,	  Ronald	  L.	  and	  Walker,	  Cuyler	  H.,	  Report	  Concerning	  the	  Debarment	  
Processes	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  (August	  14,2002),	  online:	  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/thornburghreport.pdf>	  (Second	  Report)	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  Thornburg,	  Dick;	  Santistevan	  de	  Noriega,	  Jorge;	  Gainer,	  Ronald	  L.	  and	  Walker,	  Cuyler	  H.,	  Report	  Concerning	  the	  Anti-­‐
Corruption	  Framework	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  (November	  21,	  2008),	  online:	  
<http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-­‐releases/2009-­‐12-­‐08/idb-­‐moves-­‐to-­‐strengthen-­‐anti-­‐corruption-­‐framework,6079.html>	  
136	  General	  Services	  Administration,	  Federal	  Acquisition	  Regulation	  (the	  FAR)	  “The	  FAR	  is	  the	  primary	  regulation	  for	  use	  by	  all	  
Federal	  Executive	  agencies	  in	  their	  acquisition	  of	  supplies	  and	  services	  with	  appropriated	  funds.	  It	  became	  effective	  on	  April	  1,	  
1984,	  and	  is	  issued	  within	  applicable	  laws	  under	  the	  joint	  authorities	  of	  the	  Administrator	  of	  General	  Services,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  
Defense,	  and	  the	  Administrator	  for	  the	  National	  Aeronautics	  and	  Space	  Administration,	  under	  the	  broad	  policy	  guidelines	  of	  the	  
Administrator,	  Office	  of	  Federal	  Procurement	  Policy,	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget”,	  5	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obligations.”137	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  US	  federal	  agencies	  can	  suspend	  and	  debar	  contractors	  deemed	  to	  be	  not	  
presently	  responsible	  to	  avoid	  future	  potential	  harm	  to	  the	  US	  federal	  acquisition	  system.	  	  Fraud	  and	  
corruption	  are	  only	  two	  of	  the	  various	  rationales	  under	  which	  contractors	  can	  be	  excluded	  from	  
participating	  in	  US	  federal	  procurement,	  a	  system	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  reduce	  the	  “overall	  risk	  of	  harm	  
to	  the	  procurement	  system.”138	  	  In	  addition,	  suspensions	  and	  debarments	  under	  the	  FAR	  apply	  across	  all	  
federal	  agencies	  irrespective	  of	  which	  agency	  declared	  the	  ineligibility	  of	  a	  contractor.	  
Following	  the	  same	  concept	  of	  applicability	  across	  US	  federal	  agencies	  of	  suspension	  and	  debarments	  
under	  FAR,	  in	  2010	  the	  MDBs	  signed	  a	  Cross	  Debarment	  Agreement139	  to	  allow	  each	  participant	  to	  
recognize	  the	  debarment	  decisions	  imposed	  by	  others.	  	  This	  Cross-­‐Debarment	  Agreement	  included	  the	  
adoption	  by	  all	  MDBs	  of	  the	  same	  definitions	  of	  sanctionable	  practices	  (corrupt	  practice,	  fraudulent	  
practice,	  collusive	  practice,	  and	  coercive	  practice).140	  	  Similarly,	  the	  MDBs	  also	  accepted	  some	  general	  
principles	  and	  guidelines	  for	  sanctions,	  and	  harmonized	  principles	  on	  treatment	  of	  corporate	  groups.	  
However,	  there	  has	  been	  no	  “harmonization”	  on	  the	  Sanctions	  Procedures	  utilized	  by	  the	  MDBs	  to	  
impose	  debarments	  and	  suspensions.	  
MDBs’	  main	  concern	  in	  relation	  to	  corruption	  in	  development	  projects	  and	  tools	  to	  address	  it	  	  
The	  enforcement	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  provisions	  included	  in	  Bank-­‐financed	  activities	  by	  the	  World	  
Bank	  and	  the	  IDB	  has	  been	  growing	  since	  2003.	  	  Today,	  the	  number	  of	  entities	  that	  are	  cross-­‐debarred	  
exceeds	  500,	  not	  including	  many	  other	  entities	  that	  have	  been	  debarred	  by	  each	  institution	  and	  do	  not	  
qualify	  for	  cross-­‐debarment.	  	  However,	  most	  investigations	  undertaken	  by	  MDBs	  relate	  to	  SMEs	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  development	  projects	  they	  finance.	  	  A	  reduced	  number	  of	  these	  investigations	  relate	  to	  
large	  international	  corporations	  headquartered	  in	  developed	  nations,	  such	  is	  the	  case	  with	  the	  SNC-­‐
Lavalin	  matter.	  
A	  recent	  example	  of	  a	  case	  in	  Latin	  American	  that	  exemplifies	  the	  type	  of	  SME	  that	  are	  debarred	  by	  
MDBs	  and	  its	  impact	  to	  the	  poor	  can	  be	  found	  in	  El	  Salvador.	  	  In	  2009,	  the	  IDB	  financed	  a	  housing	  
project	  for	  vulnerable	  population	  nearby	  a	  river	  in	  San	  Salvador.141	  	  The	  affected	  community	  was	  lacking	  
roads,	  housing,	  water	  and	  sanitation.142	  	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  this	  project,	  the	  executing	  agency	  opened	  
a	  bidding	  process	  for	  civil	  works	  and	  awarded	  the	  contract	  to	  a	  local	  SME.143	  	  During	  the	  construction	  
process,	  the	  executing	  agency	  found	  that	  the	  SME	  had	  submitted	  an	  invoice	  for	  works	  that	  had	  not	  been	  
performed	  according	  to	  the	  contract,	  and	  it	  was	  supported	  with	  a	  certificate	  of	  execution	  issued	  by	  a	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  Corruption:	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  of	  US	  
Suspension	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  with	  the	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  U.	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  F.	  195	  2012,	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  Domestic	  and	  International	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  to	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  Fraud	  &	  Corruption:	  A	  Comparison	  of	  US	  
Suspension	  and	  Debarment	  with	  the	  World	  Bank's	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  Corruption,	  2012	  U.	  CHI.	  LEGAL	  F.	  195(2012)	  ,	  
198-­‐199.	  
139	  This	  Agreement	  includes	  six	  MDB's:	  The	  World	  Bank,	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank,	  the	  African	  Development	  Bank,	  the	  
European	  Development	  Bank	  and	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank.	  
140	  See	  supra	  note	  7.	  






project	  supervisor	  that	  misrepresented	  the	  advancement	  of	  works.144	  	  The	  construction	  of	  the	  project	  
was	  stopped	  for	  more	  than	  seven	  months	  and	  never	  finished.	  	  The	  families	  that	  were	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  
the	  project	  had	  to	  be	  moved	  from	  their	  shelters	  to	  unfinished	  houses,145	  	  and	  as	  a	  consequence,	  
according	  to	  news	  reports,	  the	  population	  living	  in	  the	  area	  was	  exposed	  to	  unsuitable	  weather	  
conditions	  resulting	  in	  children	  getting	  sick.146	  
Based	  on	  the	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  Government,	  the	  case	  was	  investigated	  and	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  
IDB.	  	  The	  SME	  and	  its	  legal	  representative	  were	  debarred	  for	  13	  years,	  and	  the	  consultant	  to	  the	  
executing	  agency	  and	  project	  supervisor	  to	  9	  years	  of	  debarment	  respectively.	  	  These	  sanctions	  where	  
subject	  to	  Cross-­‐debarment	  and	  the	  company	  and	  individuals	  have	  been	  excluded	  from	  eligibility	  to	  
participate	  in	  projects	  financed	  by	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
MDBs	  have	  also	  used	  other	  tools	  to	  address	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  corruption	  in	  development	  projects.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  traditional	  investigations,	  the	  WBG	  through	  INT	  has	  conducted	  wide	  Bank	  portfolio	  
reviews	  known	  better	  as	  “proactive	  diagnostic	  tools,”	  or	  Detailed	  Implementation	  Reviews	  (DIRs).	  	  These	  
reviews	  have	  had	  different	  names	  over	  time,	  and	  have	  covered	  Bank	  operations	  in	  India,147	  Vietnam,	  
Cambodia,	  Indonesia	  and	  Kenya.	  	  Although	  perhaps	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  review	  was	  the	  India	  DIR	  for	  
the	  political	  implications	  that	  it	  had,	  the	  Cambodia	  DIR	  had	  direct	  measurable	  effects	  in	  the	  way	  that	  a	  
Government	  conducts	  business.	  	  The	  Cambodia	  DIR	  also	  showed	  the	  commitment	  of	  an	  MDB	  to	  
development	  as	  the	  primary	  goal	  in	  fighting	  corruption.	  
An	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  Cambodia	  DIR	  is	  that	  it	  produced	  actionable	  information	  to	  start	  some	  
investigations	  by	  INT.	  	  These	  investigations	  related	  to	  SMEs.	  	  As	  an	  example,	  on	  April	  2,	  2010,	  the	  World	  
Bank	  debarred	  a	  Cambodian	  Construction	  SME,	  Royal	  Mekong	  Construction	  and	  Development	  Pte.,	  Ltd	  
and	  its	  director	  Mr.	  Heng	  Rathpiseth	  for	  having	  engaged	  in	  fraudulent	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  projects	  
under	  investigation	  in	  Cambodia.	  	  The	  two	  Respondents	  were	  ineligible	  to	  bid	  on	  World	  Bank	  projects	  
for	  two	  years.148	  	  Despite	  the	  relative	  small	  size	  of	  the	  companies	  under	  investigation,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
DIR	  generated	  great	  ramifications.	  
In	  2004,	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  regional	  staff	  in	  Cambodia	  raised	  some	  concerns	  about	  corruption	  in	  Bank	  
financed	  projects.149	  	  During	  the	  second	  half	  of	  that	  year,	  INT	  started	  to	  address	  these	  concerns	  together	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with	  the	  Government	  of	  Cambodia	  by	  conducting	  a	  Fiduciary	  Review.150	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  exercise,	  INT	  
assisted	  the	  Government	  of	  Cambodia	  in	  identifying	  some	  weaknesses	  in	  a	  number	  of	  governmental	  
offices	  and	  helped	  devise	  an	  action	  plan	  for	  the	  Government	  to	  reduce	  the	  opportunities	  for	  future	  
corruption.	  	  Within	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  joint	  exercise,	  several	  projects	  were	  scrutinized	  and	  seven151	  were	  
found	  to	  have	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  substantiate	  allegations	  of	  fraud	  and	  corruption:152	  	  the	  
procurement	  procedures	  of	  the	  project	  agreements	  were	  not	  strictly	  obeyed,	  many	  contractors	  had	  
bribed	  government	  officials,	  project’s	  financial	  management	  systems	  and	  audit	  requirements	  had	  
control	  issues	  and	  could,	  therefore	  revealed	  breakdowns	  or	  irregularities.153	  	  In	  light	  of	  these	  results,	  the	  
World	  Bank	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Cambodia	  agreed	  on	  several	  actions,	  such	  as	  the	  strengthening	  of	  
procurement	  mechanisms	  in	  project	  design	  and	  implementation,	  identification	  of	  specific	  anti-­‐
corruption	  measures	  as	  part	  of	  project	  preparation,	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  Standard	  Operating	  
Procedures	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  project	  management	  practices.154	  
In	  June	  2006,	  while	  conducting	  a	  further	  in-­‐depth	  control	  of	  Bank-­‐financed	  projects,	  INT	  found	  that	  
three	  of	  the	  above	  ongoing	  projects	  still	  had	  corruption	  related	  problems.155	  	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  
World	  Bank	  canceled	  approximately	  USD	  2.5	  billion	  of	  funds	  for	  the	  three	  projects.	  	  The	  Government	  of	  
Cambodia	  had	  to	  agree	  to	  repay	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  canceled	  project	  funds	  plus	  interest,	  and	  to	  
strengthen	  governmental	  efforts	  in	  fighting	  corruption.	  	  These	  efforts	  included	  the	  Incorporation	  of	  
legally	  binding	  anti-­‐corruption	  plans,	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Working	  Group	  and	  the	  
enhancement	  of	  Cambodia’s	  investigative	  capacity	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  156	  	  Though	  
the	  suspension	  of	  disbursements	  may	  have	  been	  perceived	  as	  a	  drastic	  action,	  the	  World	  Bank	  had	  no	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other	  recourse	  to	  address	  the	  significant	  developmental	  impact	  of	  corruption	  in	  these	  projects.157	  	  This	  
action	  proved	  to	  be	  beneficial.	  	  During	  the	  ensuing	  period,	  the	  Government	  undertook	  the	  required	  
actions	  and	  subsequently,	  the	  World	  Bank	  lifted	  the	  suspension	  on	  the	  three	  projects.	  
	  
Areas	  of	  divergence	  between	  national	  enforcement	  efforts	  and	  MDBs	  fight	  against	  
international	  corruption:	  	  SMEs	  and	  large	  multinationals	  
The	  two	  cases	  described	  above	  demonstrate	  the	  type	  of	  corruption	  that	  concerns	  MDBs.	  	  That	  is,	  
corruption	  that	  affects	  development	  projects,	  for	  the	  most	  part	  implemented	  by	  local	  government	  
agencies.	  	  What	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  in	  both	  cases	  is	  that	  the	  corporations	  involved	  in	  these	  two	  cases	  
were	  SMEs.	  	  In	  fact,	  between	  2008	  and	  2012,	  SMEs	  and	  individuals	  added	  up	  to	  approximately	  90	  
percent	  of	  all	  entities	  debarred	  at	  the	  World	  Bank.158	  Most	  of	  these	  debarred	  enterprises	  were	  located	  
in	  developing	  countries,	  which	  the	  World	  Bank	  refers	  to	  as	  Part	  II	  Countries.159	  	  The	  remaining,	  almost	  10	  
percent	  of	  debarred	  companies,	  were	  large	  multinationals.160	  	  During	  the	  same	  period,	  100	  percent	  of	  
companies	  debarred	  by	  the	  IDB	  were	  SMEs.161	  	  The	  above	  numbers	  exemplify	  the	  reality	  of	  fighting	  
corruption	  by	  both	  MDBs	  while	  addressing	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  worldwide	  SMEs	  account	  for	  “…90	  percent	  of	  businesses	  and	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  of	  
employment…”162	  –	  and	  more	  than	  94	  percent	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean.163	  	  Thus,	  SMEs	  in	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  E.g.by	  providing	  land	  titles	  to	  people	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  income	  security,	  repairing	  and	  construction	  of	  
more	  than	  400	  km	  of	  roads,	  expanding	  the	  access	  to	  rural	  areas.	  Moreover	  poor	  people	  are	  affected	  by	  corruption	  
disproportionally	  hard	  because	  they	  are	  more	  reliant	  on	  public	  services	  while	  they	  are	  not	  able	  to	  pay	  for	  them	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  and	  suffer,	  therefore,	  more	  from	  corrupt	  officials	  and	  practices.	  “Cambodia:	  World	  Bank	  Releases	  New	  Statement	  and	  
Update”,	  The	  World	  Bank,	  (6	  June,	  2006),	  online:	  <http://go.worldbank.org/SMMHI1V940>	  (last	  access	  November	  1,	  2014).	  
158	  Anne-­‐Marie	  Leroy,	  Frank	  Fariello,	  “The	  World	  Bank	  Group	  Sanctions	  Progress	  And	  Its	  Recent	  Reforms”,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  
The	  World	  Bank,	  2012),	  online:	  <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/SanctionsProcess.pdf>	  (last	  
access:	  22	  October	  2014).	  	  In	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  review	  process	  there	  was	  concern	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  sanctioned	  
firms	  at	  the	  first	  tier	  of	  review	  were	  SMEs	  that	  would	  not	  only	  fail	  to	  contest	  the	  charges	  but	  would	  also	  fail	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  
process.	  	  See	  The	  study	  conducted	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  found	  that	  “[…]	  the	  majority	  of	  cases	  resolved	  at	  the	  first	  tier	  (92%)	  have	  
resulted	  not	  from	  an	  exchange	  of	  views	  at	  the	  first	  tier	  but	  by	  a	  ‘default’	  by	  Respondents	  failing	  to	  engage	  the	  system	  in	  any	  
way,	  either	  by	  providing	  an	  Explanation	  to	  OSD	  or	  to	  appeal	  the	  case	  to	  the	  SB.	  Most	  of	  these	  defaults	  involve	  small	  and	  
medium-­‐sized	  enterprises	  (SMEs)	  and	  form	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  pattern	  of	  non-­‐engagement	  by	  SMEs	  in	  the	  system.”	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  World	  Bank,	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  World	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  Edition”,	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  2011),	  online:	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  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  
The	  World	  Bank,	  2012),	  online:	  <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/SanctionsProcess.pdf>	  (last	  
access:	  22	  October	  2014).	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  from	  2008	  until	  2012	  195	  companies	  in	  total.	  (Sanctioned	  Firms	  and	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  Inter-­‐American	  
Development	  Bank	  (2014),	  online:	  <http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/transparency/integrity-­‐at-­‐the-­‐idb-­‐group/sanctioned-­‐firms-­‐
and-­‐individuals,1293.html>	  (last	  access:	  27	  October	  2014)).	  
162	  “IFC	  and	  Small	  and	  Medium	  Enterprises”,	  IFC	  Issue	  Brief	  /	  Small	  and	  Medium	  Enterprises,	  International	  Finance	  Corporation	  
–	  World	  Bank	  Group	  (2012),	  online:	  
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/277d1680486a831abec2fff995bd23db/AM11IFC+IssueBrief_SME.pdf?MOD=AJPERES>	  
(last	  access:	  23	  October	  2014).	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  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank,	  online:	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  24	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  2014).	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developing	  countries	  are	  one	  of	  the	  main	  engines	  of	  growth.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  MDBs	  have	  also	  
sanctioned	  individuals—25	  percent	  of	  the	  MDB	  sanctioned	  parties	  are	  individuals.164	  	  Still	  the	  fact	  
remains	  that	  within	  the	  75	  percent	  of	  sanctioned	  corporations,	  the	  majority	  are	  SMEs.	  
This	  data	  supports	  the	  fact	  that	  MDBs	  are	  interested	  in	  individuals	  and	  corporations	  that	  participate	  in	  
MDB-­‐financed	  activities.	  	  These	  individual	  consultants	  and	  local	  corporations	  (SMEs)	  have	  the	  in	  situ	  
expertise	  to	  perform	  services	  or	  provide	  goods	  and	  works	  related	  to	  developing	  projects.	  	  And	  the	  effect	  
of	  both,	  the	  projects	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  individuals	  and	  corporations	  in	  providing	  goods	  and	  
services	  has	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  the	  ground	  on	  the	  projects	  and	  countries	  that	  the	  MDBs	  serve.	  	  All	  these	  
projects	  have	  the	  objective	  of	  improving	  people’s	  lives	  by	  increasing	  their	  access	  to	  multiple	  services,	  
self-­‐sufficiency	  opportunities,	  and	  establishing	  a	  stable	  environment,	  all	  part	  of	  the	  development	  
objective	  that	  guides	  MDBs’	  purpose.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime	  (UNODC)	  has	  established	  that	  the	  smaller	  an	  
enterprise	  is,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  corruption	  and	  to	  perceive	  it	  as	  a	  major	  business	  
obstacle.165	  	  According	  to	  the	  UNODC,	  the	  reasons	  for	  SMEs	  to	  engage	  in	  corrupt	  activities	  depend	  in	  
part	  on	  the	  environment	  they	  operate.	  	  SMEs	  participating	  in	  markets	  where	  corruption	  is	  common	  
practice	  have	  a	  slim	  chance	  of	  successfully	  doing	  business	  without	  engaging	  in	  illegal	  practices.166	  	  For	  
this	  reason,	  it	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  Sanctions	  Systems	  of	  MDBs	  handle	  more	  cases	  
related	  with	  SMEs	  than	  large	  multinational	  corporations.	  The	  number	  of	  SMEs	  intricately	  related	  to	  
development	  work	  in	  member	  countries	  is	  significantly	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  large	  multinational	  
corporations.	  	  Although,	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  MDBs	  keep	  a	  keen	  eye	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  large	  multinationals	  in	  
member	  countries,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SNC-­‐Lavalin,	  these	  cases	  make	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  the	  MDBs	  
sanctioned	  entities.	  	  	  
In	  relation	  to	  imposed	  sanctions,	  the	  MDBs	  procedures	  have	  established	  a	  list	  of	  administrative	  
sanctions	  to	  be	  imposed	  on	  respondents.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  sanctioning	  guidelines,	  the	  MDBs	  can	  decide	  
from	  a	  number	  of	  sanctions,	  including	  reprimand,	  debarment,	  conditional	  non-­‐debarment,	  and	  
debarment	  with	  conditional	  release.	  	  These	  sanctions’	  objective	  is	  to	  deter	  wrongdoing	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
corporations	  and	  individuals,	  and	  protect	  the	  projects	  financed	  by	  the	  MDBs	  in	  order	  to	  fulfill	  their	  
development	  objectives.	  	  All	  this	  within	  the	  understanding	  that	  corruption	  undermines	  development	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164The	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  was	  taken	  from	  SEC	  website	  and	  the	  MDBs	  list	  of	  sanctioned	  parties	  accessed	  on	  March	  15,	  2015.	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  Nations	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Development	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  Nations	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  on	  Drugs	  and	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  Online:	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  access:	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  2014).	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  Corruption	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  Online:	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projects167	  and	  MDBs	  can	  protect	  project	  beneficiaries	  and	  stakeholders	  through	  preventive	  and	  
sanctioning	  actions.	  
In	  contrast,	  national	  enforcement	  systems	  such	  as	  the	  US	  DOJ	  and	  SEC	  are	  more	  inclined	  to	  pursue	  FCPA	  
cases	  in	  relation	  to	  multinational	  corporations	  like	  Siemens,	  Ralph	  Lauren	  Corporation,	  Tyco,	  Hewlett	  
Packard,	  and	  ALCOA.	  	  As	  earlier	  explained,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  FCPA	  was	  born	  out	  of	  the	  corrupt	  
actions	  of	  some	  large	  US	  corporations	  abroad.	  	  Its	  expansion	  to	  the	  OECD	  through	  the	  Convention	  was	  
catalyzed	  by	  complains	  of	  some	  US	  corporations	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  “level	  playing	  field”	  generated	  by	  the	  
same	  FCPA.	  	  These	  corporations	  requested	  action	  by	  US	  authorities	  to	  protect	  their	  commercial	  interests	  
abroad	  by	  inviting	  other	  nations	  to	  adopt	  similar	  norms	  to	  the	  FCPA.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  
FCPA	  and	  similar	  norms	  in	  other	  countries	  like	  Canada	  follows	  the	  path	  of	  “leveling	  the	  playing	  field”,	  
although	  in	  the	  Case	  of	  Canada,	  as	  described	  in	  the	  decision	  of	  Justice	  Hackland,	  with	  some	  concern	  in	  
the	  effects	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  affected	  country.	  	  This	  historical	  development	  informs	  in	  part	  the	  
enforcement	  of	  national	  laws	  against	  foreign	  bribery.	  
In	  fact,	  the	  proceedings	  conducted	  by	  the	  SEC	  have	  resulted	  in	  severe	  punishments	  in	  the	  form	  or	  fines	  
for	  corporations	  and	  sometimes	  imprisonment	  for	  their	  legal	  representatives,	  CEOs	  or	  staff.168	  	  While	  
SEC	  has	  concentrated	  on	  charging	  corporations,	  the	  DOJ	  prosecutes	  both,	  individuals	  and	  entities.	  	  On	  
the	  one	  hand,	  all	  of	  the	  defendants	  charged	  and	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  SEC	  on	  2013	  were	  corporations.	  	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  63	  percent	  of	  DOJ	  enforcement	  actions	  during	  2013	  were	  against	  individual	  and	  37	  
percent	  against	  corporations.169	  
The	  fines	  imposed	  by	  SEC	  are	  the	  outcome	  of	  either	  formal	  proceedings	  or	  settlements	  agreements,	  
depending	  on	  the	  firm’s	  willingness	  to	  cooperate	  with	  SEC.170	  	  Companies	  like	  Alstom,	  Avon,	  Halliburton,	  
and	  Pfizer	  have	  agreed	  to	  pay	  millions	  of	  dollars	  to	  settle	  SEC	  charges.171	  	  Settlements	  reached	  between	  
the	  SEC	  and	  corporations	  are	  usually	  comprised	  by	  two	  components;	  a	  monetary	  penalty	  and	  a	  
compliance	  program.	  	  Compliance	  programs	  typically	  include	  the	  imposition	  of	  extensive	  policies	  and	  
procedures,	  training,	  vendor	  reviews,	  due	  diligence,	  expense	  control,	  and	  escalation	  of	  red	  flags,	  to	  
name	  a	  few.172	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  all	  SEC	  enforcement	  actions,	  corporations	  have	  not	  only	  paid	  several	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penalties	  but	  also	  have	  significantly	  increased	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  spent	  in	  compliance	  programs.173	  	  
As	  it	  was	  mentioned	  earlier,	  these	  settlements	  have	  resulted	  in	  large	  sums	  that	  have	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  
US	  Government	  and	  have	  not	  made	  their	  way	  to	  countries	  that	  were	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  contracts	  
or	  agreements	  upon	  which	  bribes	  were	  paid.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Perhaps	  the	  last	  point	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  highlights	  the	  great	  difference	  between	  national	  
enforcement	  by	  the	  US	  and	  Canada	  of	  foreign	  bribery	  laws	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Sanctions	  Systems	  by	  MDBs.	  	  
While	  national	  jurisdictions	  are	  keen	  in	  sanctioning	  individuals	  and	  corporations	  for	  their	  wrongdoing,	  
there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  evidence	  of	  restitution	  to	  the	  real	  victims	  of	  the	  corrupt	  practices	  in	  developing	  
countries.	  	  So	  far	  the	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  if	  bribes	  were	  paid	  by	  a	  corporation	  or	  individual	  subject	  to	  
the	  US	  or	  Canadian	  jurisdictions,	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  contract	  or	  dealing	  in	  a	  developing	  country,	  the	  
penalties	  imposed	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  proceedings	  or	  settlement	  agreement	  are	  not	  directed	  at	  
restituting	  the	  affected	  developing	  country,	  nor	  the	  specific	  communities.	  	  And	  this	  may	  be	  explained	  
because	  the	  foreign	  bribery	  laws	  were	  created	  primarily	  to	  protect	  the	  markets	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  
enacted	  such	  laws—primarily	  the	  US.	  	  Under	  such	  proposition,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  US,	  the	  affected	  party	  
in	  any	  foreign	  bribery	  scheme	  would	  be	  the	  US	  market,	  the	  US	  government	  and	  its	  people.	  
On	  the	  opposite	  side,	  MDBs	  main	  concern	  is	  development	  in	  the	  countries	  they	  serve.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  
Sanctions	  Systems	  were	  created	  as	  part	  of	  this	  objective	  and	  strive	  to	  root-­‐out	  corruption	  of	  developing	  
projects	  while	  assisting	  member	  countries	  in	  strengthening	  governance.	  	  The	  sanctions	  imposed	  by	  
MDBs	  are	  aimed	  at	  avoiding	  contracting	  with	  corporations	  or	  individuals	  that	  engage	  in	  prohibited	  
practices.	  	  While	  at	  the	  same	  time	  collaborating	  with	  national	  entities	  in	  addressing	  areas	  in	  which	  there	  
could	  be	  governance	  challenges,	  as	  it	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Cambodia.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  MDBs	  interest	  in	  
investigating	  and	  sanctioning	  corruption	  lies	  in	  the	  effects	  that	  it	  has	  on	  development	  projects	  and	  the	  
poor.	  	  Corruption	  affects	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  communities	  which	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  MDBs	  are	  trying	  to	  
assist	  through	  development	  projects.	  	  These	  development	  projects	  tend	  to	  engage	  for	  the	  most	  part	  
SMEs	  which	  comprise	  the	  majority	  of	  corporations	  worldwide	  and	  are	  a	  significant	  source	  of	  
development.	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  MDBs’	  Sanctions	  Systems	  deal	  with	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  
SMEs.	  
Although	  this	  is	  an	  apparent	  point	  of	  divergence	  between	  national	  authorities	  such	  as	  the	  US	  and	  
Canada	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  MDBs	  on	  the	  other,	  it	  could	  also	  prove	  to	  be	  an	  area	  of	  convergence.	  	  
Both	  systems	  are	  looking	  at	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  same	  problem.	  	  Foreign	  bribery	  involves	  actions	  in	  
multiple	  jurisdictions	  and	  affects	  multiple	  parties.	  	  It	  affects	  and	  distorts	  the	  markets	  in	  which	  large	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multinationals	  operate	  and	  generates	  pervasive	  advantages	  to	  those	  companies	  that	  indulge	  in	  bribery.	  	  
It	  has	  devastating	  effects	  on	  the	  communities	  that	  need	  the	  assistance	  the	  most,	  while	  challenging	  local	  
governance	  structures.	  	  However,	  national	  systems	  and	  the	  MDBs	  get	  to	  see	  different	  angles	  of	  the	  
actions	  of	  wrongdoers	  and	  could	  benefit	  in	  continuing	  the	  pursuit	  of	  complementary	  enforcement	  
actions	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SNC-­‐Lavalin.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  affected	  developing	  nations	  could	  benefit	  from	  the	  
proceeds	  of	  the	  heavy	  sums	  resulting	  from	  fines	  imposed	  by	  national	  enforcement	  agencies	  in	  foreign	  
bribery	  cases,	  money	  that	  could	  serve	  to	  strengthen	  local	  governance	  and	  hence,	  level	  the	  international	  
playing	  field.	  
